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The Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) business model is that, the vendors host their software 
application on their own servers, release it to several customers at one time through the 
internet using a multi-tenant architecture, and charge the customers by a recurring 
monthly subscription model. This new software management model has been place great 
expectation on as a more efficient software business model and as a future trend of the 
industry.  
This research uses firm level financial data of software vendors from 2002 to 2007. We 
categorize software vendors into three groups: pure-SaaS vendor, mixed-SaaS vendor, 
and non-SaaS vendor. This categorization is used as the most critical dummy variable of 
the following analysis. We first build a performance model for SaaS business and study 
the effect of different business model on firm performance.  Then we analyze how these 
three models affect the productivity of the vendor company. We build two Cobb-Douglas 
production models – balance sheet model and income statement model – using different 
combination of inputs and output. The productivity of software companies is evaluated 
from three aspects: economies of scale, marginal product of input factors and total factor 
productivity. Our results indicate that SaaS model has significant differences to 
conventional model in all three aspects. Especially, we find out that pure-SaaS 
companies have less scale economy than traditional packaged software companies, 
which breaks the existing common expectation of large economies of scale on SaaS 
model.  
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Main Body of Thesis 
1. Introduction 
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is a newly emerged software delivery business model. 
It is expected to be a growing trend for enterprise software vendors in the future. As 
early as in 2000, it was predicted that there would be a brand-new landscape for the 
future of software, in which a development called “servicization” would be a great 
revolution (Hock et al. 2000). After that, the Application Service Provider (ASP, a 
similar term to SaaS) model emerged and the favor of IT outsourcing market 
gradually transmits from on-premise software packages towards on-demand software 
services (Sääksjärvi et al. 2005). It was expected by the industry that the SaaS model 
would cause “a sea change” in the software industry (Software & Information 
Industry Association (SIIA) 2001). In the following years, this prediction was proved 
by the market both from the vendor side and from the client side. From the vendor 
side, the SaaS suppliers won highly appreciation from venture capital investments 
(Akella and Kanakamedala 2007). In a survey about SaaS, it was discovered that 
companies with SaaS as their main business had a revenues rise by 18% from 2002 to 
2005, which was from $295 million to $485 million (Dubey and Wagle 2007). In 
another report about SaaS business, it was forecasted that the revenue of worldwide 
software-on-demand (a similar term to SaaS) would grow from $4,000 million USD 
in 2007 to $15,000 million USD in 2011, which would be a growth from 2% to 5% in 
total software market revenue (TenWolde 2007). In terms of annual growth rate, it 
was indicated that the annual growth rate of SaaS would be 22.1% through 2011 for 
the aggregate enterprise application software markets, which would be higher than 
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twice of the growth rate of the total enterprise software (Mertz et al. 2007). Also, 
around 10% of the enterprise software vendors expected to transform into pure-
playing SaaS vendors by 2009 (Traudl and Konary 2005). From the client side, SaaS 
is a demand-centric software delivery model received great acceptance across various 
different industries. In October 2006, 64% of 72 senior IT executives claimed in a 
survey that they were planning to implement service-oriented architectures in 2007 
(Akella and Kanakamedala 2007). And this intension was proved to be common 
among these potential clients of SaaS by another industry research report (Traudl and 
Konary 2005). 
Software as a service is a model of internet-based software deployment in which the 
vendors provide their application to customers as a service based on usage. The 
application is usually hosted in the vendors’ own hardware, and they take up the 
maintenance and security of these devices as well. In contrast, the conventional 
software vendors sell the software to customers at a one-time large fixed licensing fee, 
and next install, maintain, upgrade the software application on the buyer’s machine. 
Salesforce.com, a vendor of online Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
application, is regarded to be the most successful SaaS adopter. Since 1999, it started 
their CRM business. After its IPO in 2004, their revenue stride up from 176.4 million 
to 748.7 million while its stock return increased by 364%. Client successes of 
Salesforce.com include the following stories (from Salesforce.com): Cisco 
implemented Salesforce.com to 15000 users and significantly improved their 
centralized information management; Prestitempo Division of Deutsche Bank 
deployed Salesforce.com in only one month and a half and found it to be better than 
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their previous inhouse platform; Salesforce.com enabled Starburks to millions of 
customer feedbacks which shaped the company to who it is today; Allianz Insurance 
benefit from Salesforce.com with a 17.5 increase in opportunity conversation rate. 
Abundant success cases from other SaaS providers suggest that the boom of adopting 
SaaS software is not just another crazy technology fad. 
Currently, several large software companies offer both SaaS applications and 
traditional packaged software applications. These firms may be skeptical about the 
prospect of SaaS and thus only experiment with the new SaaS model to test its 
profitability, fit of the SaaS model with their capabilities, customers’ acceptance of 
SaaS, and competitors’ responses. The mixed model could be the result of the long 
transition time for non-SaaS firms to completely migrate to the SaaS model. Another 
explanation could be that SaaS and non-SaaS applications may have different target 
customer groups and a software vendor can provide both services in order to increase 
its potential customer base. At the same time, the mixed-SaaS vendors may enjoy the 
economies of scope from selling two similar products in one firm. Therefore, in this 
study, we group sample companies into three categories: pure-SaaS firms, non-SaaS 
firms, and mixed-SaaS firms. Companies offering only SaaS solutions, such as 
Salesforce.com and DealerTrack, are categorized as pure-SaaS players. Companies 
offering both SaaS and packaged software products, such as Ariba and Oracle, are 
categorized as mixed-SaaS companies. Other conventional software vendors are 
grouped as non-SaaS firms. This taxonomy is an innovation of this research and is 
used as a critical input factor in the following studies. We compile an unbalanced 
panel dataset of 212 publicly listed software companies between 2002 and 2007 for 
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our empirical task. For each firm, we mark it with dummy variables for firm 
categorization based on their business description in annual reports. Formal 
definitions and detailed categorization results are provided in Section 3. 
Software-as-a-Service business model has become a hot spot in both academic 
research and market research companies’ works. There have been a lot of academic 
literatures about the technology to realize SaaS, the concept of SaaS model, and the 
competition between SaaS and non-SaaS business. Beyond the academic world, 
market research companies and writers from trade magazines put their interests into 
the market size, potential to growth, sales, and investments of SaaS markets. The 
SaaS vendors themselves released a lot of publications to promote their products by 
analyzing SaaS model from their clients’ angle. Different from all these mentioned, 
this research will focus the attention on the software vendor side. The goal of this 
study is to investigate the impacts of this SaaS innovation on the performance and 
productivity of software vendors. Most of the existing studies are theoretical studies 
except Susarla et al. (2003). As a result, the present study could contribute to fill this 
gap and provide more empirical findings about the performance of SaaS firms. We 
present the performance analysis and productivity analysis separately in Section 4 and 
Section 5.  
In performance analysis, we look into whether the business model of a software 
company would affect its financial performance. Abundant researches have been 
done into the benefits of SaaS model to its vendors (see details in Section 2), and we 
would like to see whether these benefits are reflected financially. We use four typical 
financial ratios to measure performance: price to book ratio (P/B ratio), return on 
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asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and debt ratio. And our research questions for 
this section are: Do pure- and mixed-SaaS models exhibit better or worth 1) P/B ratio, 
2) ROA, 3) ROE, and 4) Debt Ratio? These four ratios are used as output of our 
econometric model. The inputs in this model are dummy variables for firm categories 
and control variables for time and firm size. Our results show that pure-SaaS firms 
have significantly better performance in P/B ratio, ROA, ROE and Debt Ratio. 
Mixed-SaaS also exhibit positive performance results but is not significant. 
Specifically, pure-SaaS firms have extremely large value in P/B ratio than the other 
two groups. This means pure-SaaS firm is greatly over-valued in the equity market 
than their real book value. This finding is consistent with the observation of a market 
research company named SoftwareEquity Group. They discovered that in mergers & 
acquisitions cases with a pure-SaaS firm as target, the acquirer usually paid around 
7.5 times higher than the targets revenue. Although the unique pricing model of pure-
SaaS firms (see the details in Section 2) contribute to the high performance, this 
surprising finding is just a result of the excellent financial performance of pure-SaaS 
firms and great growth potential of this model.  
We run a productivity analysis section as an in-depth research into the mechanism of 
how SaaS model could succeed. Also telling from the various benefits of SaaS model 
to its vendors, it is natural for us to assume that these benefits would be realized in the 
productivity of the company. As a unique property of SaaS, if the SaaS model creates 
new value, the increased value will be shared between SaaS vendors and clients. It is 
interesting to investigate which component of the production function of SaaS 
vendors has different productivity from the conventional software vendors so that 
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SaaS vendors can succeed. Especially, we doubt about the assumption in previous 
works that SaaS vendors will exhibit larger economies of scale (see details in Section 
2). Our research questions for this section are: (1) Do pure- and mixed-SaaS vendors 
exhibit larger or smaller economies of scale? (2) How does SaaS affect the marginal 
product of various input factors of software vendors? (3) Do pure- and mixed-SaaS 
vendor exhibit larger or smaller total factor productivity? We adopt the production 
function analysis methodology from classical economics theory. We build two Cobb-
Douglas production function models using different combinations production of 
inputs and output. We use capital, labour and intangible asset to build the balance 
sheet model, and build the income statement model with cost of goods sold, expenses 
on research and development (R&D), and expenses on selling, general and 
administrative activities. The econometric model we used to test the hypothesis is 
OLS with panel-corrected standard error (PCSE). The results support our suspicion 
on economies of scale of pure-SaaS firms:  pure-SaaS firms demonstrate weaker 
economies of scale than non-SaaS firms. For mixed-SaaS firms, they are proved to be 
of stronger economies of scale by our finding. Our results on marginal product of 
input factors are also brand-new to the literature: Comparing to non-SaaS firms, pure-
SaaS firms have larger marginal product of capital input while smaller marginal 
product of labor, especially for R&D staff and SG&A staff. Mixed-SaaS firms 
generally over perform non-SaaS firms although the results are less stable and 
significant. Our examination on total factor productivity is seriously limited by our 
small sample size and short sampling period. We cannot give a stable conclusion on 
TFP and may leave it to future research. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 
presents our data collection and firm categorization methods. Section 4 is about firm 
performance analysis, including research model, data analysis, discussion and 
implications. Section 5 presents the firm productivity analysis, including research 
model, data analysis, discussion and implications. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and Literature 
2.1. The Software-as-a-Service Business Model 
There are three major differences between SaaS and conventional packaged 
software business model: (1) SaaS is web-based access to a commercial software 
application, while conventional software is installed on the vendor’s hardware. (2) 
SaaS is realized by a multi-tenant architecture, which enables multiple clients to 
use the software at the same time. Conventional packaged software is built on a 
single-tenant architecture. Clients could only use their own software instance 
through their own servers. (3) Customers pay a recurring subscription fee to SaaS 
vendor based on usage to the vendors and alienate the complete ownership of the 
software to its vendor. In exchange for these, the vendor takes up all the support, 
training, infrastructure and security risks. In contrast, conventional software 
developers sell software license to the clients, together with that, they have full 
ownership to their copy of software and need to ensure the security and on-going 
maintenance and management of the applications by themselves. We will 




Internet Access to a software application is a revolution to the developer as well 
as to the clients. So to speak, a SaaS user accesses his ERP account like his email 
account: nothing is installed and stored locally except for an interface and an 
account. To the users, they get rid of the heavy load and long kickoff time of 
software installation in their local computer. To the vendor, the challenge is 
bigger that they need to take up responsibilities which were not supposed to be 
theirs in conventional software model: they need to develop new technology, run 
the servers, and market new concept – SaaS.  
Multi-tenant Architecture 
A tenant in SaaS architecture is a client who uses the application through the 
internet. SaaS vendors install their application in their own server and distribute it 
through the internet to the clients. One server, one data center, and one 
management team in the vendor side could support several different clients at the 
same time, using multi-tenancy architecture (Sääksjärvi et al. 2005; SaaS 
Executive Council of SIIA 2006). Comparing to traditional model, clients host 
their own servers in-house and run the application only for themselves. Viewing 
the clients and the vendor as a whole, this architecture improved the utilization 
rate and efficiency of servers. However, it also brings problems, one of which is 
customization.  
The level of customization is an important factor of software quality. Since SaaS 
vendors use the same set of software to support different clients at the same time, 
it is not possible for them to maintain customized version for each customer. 
System integration to the customer’s business model will be the major challenge 
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to them (Seltsikas and Currie 2008). Also, it strongly affects the competency of 
the application (Sun et al. 2008) and the trust from service consumers (Tan et al. 
2008). Smaller and more frequent upgrades are released in SaaS models than in 
traditional software model and mostly will be initiated by the vendor (Choudhary 
2007; Dubey and Wagle 2007). To fix this problem, software engineers are still 
innovating for technologies to solve this problem. Special techniques, such as 
variability descriptor (Mietzner and Leymann 2008a; Mietzner and Leymann 
2008b), has been proposed to highly enhance the level of customization of SaaS 
applications. And there have been a lot of successful cases of well-customized 
SaaS applications in areas like Invoice Management System (Kwok et al. 2008a) 
and Electronic Contract Management System (Kwok et al. 2008b). 
Recurring Subscription Fee Model 
The main stream pricing model for SaaS business is a subscription-based 
recurring payment model. It is like renting the application to clients. The vendor 
charges the customer a monthly subscription fee based on actually used software 
and a commitment to the number of users (SIIA 2001). For example, 
Salseforce.com charges a starting monthly subscription fee at $65 per user per 
month (Choudhary 2007). This model changes the cost allocation of software 
deployment and makes 80% to 90% of the total cost happened during the actual 
in-use time of the application, while in the traditional model, the biggest amount 
of cost will be the initial licensing fee (SaaS EC of SIIA 2006). Also, this model 
changes the competition between traditional software and SaaS software. It allows 
SaaS firms and traditional packaged software firms to coexist in a competitive 
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market (Ma and Seidmann 2008) and segments the market in a way that small and 
medium size business with low transaction volume will choose SaaS while large 
firms prefer traditional software model (Fan et al. 2008; Ma and Seidmann 2008). 
The short term competition will reach equilibrium at a higher price. And the long 
term competition will be influenced majorly by software quality (Fan et al. 2008). 
Also, this recurring subscription fee model will increase the incentive of SaaS 
firms to invest more into software quality and finally reach greater profits and 
social welfare (Choudhary 2007).  
2.2. Benefits and Shortcomings of SaaS 
Software-as-a-Service model brings a lot of benefits to its vendors. Firstly, the 
online access saves a lot of costs and efforts which are previously spent on 
distribution (Dubey and Wagle 2007) and implementation (Dubey and Wagle 
2007; SIIA 2001). This delivery method also restricts the possibility for 
customization and potential debugging which will also be great time and efforts 
saving for vendors (Dubey and Wagle 2007; SIIA 2001). Third, since all the 
servers are located in the vendor side, comparing to the traditional packaged 
software models, SaaS vendors do not need to send customer support staff to the 
customer to do maintenance work (SIIA 2001). After wider acceptance of the 
model, the efficiency of online delivery (Dubey and Wagle 2007; Wikipedia.org) 
and multi-tenant model (SaaS EC of SIIA 2006) will give large economies of 
scale for SaaS vendor companies. The recurring payment model guarantees 
smoother revenue flow for the vendor company (Dubey and Wagle 2007; SIIA 
2001). The web-based service model opens new markets in small and medium 
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business segment and the enlarged installed base could generate positive feedback 
and bring greater value (Shapiro and Varian 1999; SIIA 2001). 
The benefits of SaaS model to its clients are widely discussed in the media in 
promoting their own business. The jobs of software application deployment, 
maintenance, upgrading will be done by the vendor as if corporate IT staff were 
migrated from supporting developers to users. This provides valuable human 
resources and great business agility to other areas and enables the customers to 
focus more on core businesses (Carraro and Chong 2006; SaaS EC of SIIA 2006). 
SaaS saves costs and efforts in installing and maintaining software applications 
and hardware infrastructures. Software maintenance took up over 75% of the 
Fortune 1000’s IS spending (Eastwood 1993), which means that SaaS model will 
help save these money for the Fortune 1000 customers. At the same time, the 
professional IT staff from the vendor will initiatively provide better and faster 
support as an improvement of quality of SaaS applications (NetReturn Pty Ltd. 
2007; SaaS EC of SIIA 2006). SaaS significantly reduces the initial financial risks 
of software adoption by reducing the implementation fee (Carraro and Chong 
2006), shortening the time-to-production, and simplifying the deployment process 
(NetReturn Pty Ltd. 2007). SaaS reduce the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) of 
the application (NetReturn Pty Ltd. 2007; SaaS EC of SIIA 2006) which means 
SaaS is cheaper than licensed software in almost every aspect. Also, SaaS was 
expected to make great saving in total cost ownership in various cost drivers like 
initial capital expenses, design and deployment costs, ongoing operations, training 
and support costs, and intangible costs (SaaS EC of SIIA 2006). 
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As other new business models at their infancy stage, Software-as-a-Service model 
has several shortcomings as well. First of all, the low-level customization makes 
SaaS not suitable for innovative or highly specialized niche ecosystems industries 
(Sääksjärvi et al. 2005; SIIA 2001, SaaS EC of SIIA 2006; Wikipedia.org). The 
fact that the servers are located in the vendor side is also double-edge swords. It 
increases concerns of data security, and application performance restrictions 
(Sääksjärvi et al. 2005). For the vendors, the recurring payment mode gives a 
smoother revenue flow but at the same time makes the initial turnover of selling 
the application much lower comparing to traditional packaged software’s high 
license fee. Also, SaaS seems to have lower effect of lock-in, which may cause 
difficulties in maintaining existing customers (SaaS EC of SIIA 2006; 
Wikipedia.org). In terms of starting up a SaaS business, it cost higher initial 
investment on buying servers and running applications for all the customers 
(Sääksjärvi et al. 2005). The higher initial investment and longer breakeven time 
makes the SaaS model more risky. Lastly, SaaS seems to have lower lock-in 
effect because of lower migration cost for clients. 
2.3. ASP, On-Demand Computing, and SaaS 
There exist a lot of similar terms in the industry as well as in the academic 
literature. Application Service Provider and On-Demand software are the most 
common two.  
Application Service Provider 
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In the early years of the 21st century, ASP and SaaS were totally equivalent 
concepts (SIIA 2001) and ASP was more popular in terms of times of appearance 
in the literature and industry reports (such as Demirkan and Cheng 2008; Kim and 
Kim 2008; Ma and Seidmann 2005; Seltsikas and Currie 2002; Susalia et al. 
2003). Also, the term Application Service Providers described almost the same 
characteristics with what we mentioned about SaaS. Minor differences between 
these two terms started to emerge since recent years. ASP as “earlier attempts as 
Internet-delivered software” were regarded to be more similar to traditional on-
premise software applications than to SaaS applications (Carraro and Chong, 
2006). Actually, ASP was more like a third party outsourcing vendor between the 
software developer and the customer (SaaS EC of SIIA 2006). They got 
authorization from the software developers and release the software to the end 
users as a service. However, these two terms are not strictly differentiated in the 
industry and these claims of differences have very limited influence, and a lot of 
firms still use ASP to describe their SaaS business. Besides, the key 
characteristics of these two are still the same (or the differences will not influence 
the result of our results). Normally ASP also provides internet access through the 
internet and maintains the servers and data centers for their clients. They also get 
recurring payment from their customers (Wikipedia.org). So to avoid confusion 
and to ensure the validity of our next step sampling, we do not separate the two 
terms and will use Software-as-a-Service, or SaaS, in the following discussion.  
IS researchers has examined the ASP business model via different perspectives. 
Walsh (2003) provides an excellent overview about the technologies, economies, 
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and strategies of ASP. They found that ASP promised a lower cost per user and at 
the same time redistributed responsibilities and risks among organizations. Cheng 
and Koehler (2003) model the economic dynamics between the ASP and its 
potential customers. Under a realistic economies-of-scale assumption, they 
showed that there exist equilibrium of optimal pricing policy and firm capacity. 
Under this situation, they found that the optimal number of subscribers remained 
the same while the profit of the company increased with market demand. Susarlia 
et al. (2003) develop a conceptual model of customer satisfaction of ASP based 
on the marketing literature to empirically show that expectations about ASP 
service have a significant impact on the performance evaluation of ASPs. They 
showed that the user’s disconfirmation effects negatively affected their 
satisfaction with an ASP, while user’s perceived provider performance and prior 
systems integration could positively influence their satisfaction on ASP. They 
further analysed that the functional capability and quality assurance of the ASP 
could positively improve user’s perceived provider performance, thus increase 
their ASP satisfaction. Smith and Kumar (2004) developed a theory of ASP 
adoption from the client’s perspective through ground theory methodology based 
on analysis of primary and secondary data on ASP use. And they compared and 
contrasted the similarities and differences among IS outsourcing, ASP, and 
electronic data interchange (EDI). Through both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, Ma et al. (2005) identify seven dimensions (features, availability, 
reliability, assurance, empathy, conformance, and security) of service quality for 
the ASP vendors to improve. Currie and Parikh (2006) develop a generic strategic 
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model for understanding value creation in web services from a provider’s 
perspective. They identified market leadership, strategic differentiation, and 
revenue generation as three critical success factors of web service based on 
literatures from strategic management, e-business and IT management. Demirkan 
and Cheng (2008) study an application services supply chain by the analytical 
modelling approach. They separated application infrastructure provider (AIP) and 
application service provider (ASP) and built a supply chain model composited by 
AIPs, ASPs and end user. Their findings indicated that the ASPs always 
determined their capacity at the maximum level of market demand and simply 
passed the risk of over- and under capacity costs to the end-users. 
On-Demand Software 
Basically, on-demand software has the same meaning with Software-as-a-Service. 
On-demand software (also called utility computing) is a popular synonym of 
Software-as-a-Service. Some “SaaS” companies, such as Omniture Inc., use this 
term to describe their business model in their official annual reports. There exist 
scarce academic papers that are dedicated to discuss issues about on-demand 
computing or SaaS. Bhargava and Sundaresan (2005) study various pricing 
mechanisms for on-demand computing with demand uncertainty by using 
economics modelling approach. They build a contingent bid auction pricing 
model related to the availability-utility commitment tradeoffs. Choudhary (2007) 
analyses an economic pricing model that contrasts SaaS and perpetual licensing. 
They found that the unique subscription pricing model of SaaS would give more 
incentive to software vendors’ investment in product development, thus lead to 
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higher software quality and social welfare in equilibrium. Fan et al. (2009) uses a 
game theoretical approach to examine short- and long-term competition between 
SaaS and conventional software providers. Different from Choudhary, their 
results claimed that in the long run equilibrium, the price of SaaS would increase 
together with the operation cost of SaaS, which might affect SaaS vendor’s R&D 
incentive.  
Other Similar Terms 
There were some less popular terms in use, such as Application Infrastructure 
Providers (AIPs), Internet Business Service (IBS), Business Service Provider 
(BSP), Solutions Service Provider (SSP). They were also given similar definitions 
to software as a service (or else, some of their businesses are integrated into 
today’s SaaS or ASPs, like AIP) (SIIA 2001). Nowadays these terms are not 
widely used any more. So they will not affect our usage of the term SaaS as well. 
2.4. IT and Productivity 
We adopt production theory, Cobb-Douglas Function, and theory of economies of 
scale from microeconomics into our productivity research.  
Production Theory and Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Production function describes the relationship between a set of inputs and their 
maximum outputs in an economy within existing technology and economy (Baye 
2009). The general mathematic form of a single-output production function is 
usually expressed as: 
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Y=f(X1, X2, X3…Xn), 
where Y stands for output, and X1 to Xn represent factor inputs, such as capital, 
labor, and material.  
The most commonly adopted production function is the Cobb-Douglas function. 
Initially it was developed using labor and capital as two inputs and production 
quantity as output. The relationship between inputs and output was derived from 
the manufacturing industry data in the US from 1899 to 1922 (Cobb and Douglas 
1928). The commonly used expression of Cobb-Douglas function is: 
Y=ALαKβ, 
where: 
Y = Total Production Yield, 
L = Labor Input, 
K = Capital Input, 
A = Total Factor Productivity, 
α and β are elasticity of L and K respectively.  
The input and output factors used in Cobb-Douglas function develop over time. 
Originally in Cobb-Douglas function’s applications, researchers used dollar 
values of production yield, capital input and labor input (Cobb and Douglas 1928). 
In Cobb-Douglas function’s factor measurement, output was measured as the net 
value of product in dollar values, capital input was expressed in dollar values of 
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both fixed and working capital, while labor input was measure by average 
numbers of waged employees including all kinds of employment contracts 
(Douglas 1948). Although the function included both quantities and prices, it was 
still consistent with the marginal production theory since marginal productivity 
could also be measured by both quantity and value (Douglas 1948). Later, for 
practical reasons (Chung 1994; Walter 1963), researchers added different factors 
according to the nature of the industry under investigated or the needs of the 
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where A is a scale factor and X represents the input to the production process. By 
taking logarithm of both sides of the equation, we have 
ln ܻ ൌ lnܣ ൅෍ߚ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൈ ln ௜ܺ 
which can be easily estimated by ordinary least square or other advanced 
econometrics models. The scale factor A in Cobb-Douglas function also 
represents the total factor productivity (TFP) in the literature. TFP captures the 
impacts of factors on the output Y which could not be covered by the inputs, such 
as technology innovation, macro economy, etc. Bear in mind that the intercept 
term of the right hand side is the logarithm of the TFP. From this expression, it is 
obvious that the beta coefficients represent the output elasticity of each input 
factor: a 1% increase in input factor i lead to iβ  % increase in Y. The Cobb-
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Douglas production has several nice properties: first, the optimal budget share of 
each input factor is invariant in input factor prices. That is, if the computer 
hardware prices drop, the software vendor will use more computers so that the 
proportion of budget spent on hardware is the same. Second, the sum of beta 
coefficients represents a measure of economies of scale. Formally, if  
















=∑  this production function 
has constant return to scale. 
Application of Production Theory in IS Literature 
In the information systems literature, the most fruitful application of production 
function analysis is the studies about how spending on computers and IT workers 
can boost the productivity at the firm level. In the early 90s, researchers first 
found that information technologies had no contribution to the production firms’ 
outputs (Barua et al. 1991; Loveman 1994) or the marginal benefits could not 
cover marginal cost (Morrison and Roberts 1990). Later, the seminal paper by 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) documents how IS spending had made a substantial 
and statistically significant contribution to firm output. In a related paper (Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson 1996), the authors show that IT has increased productivity and 
created substantial value for consumers but does not improve profitability for 
firms. There exist extensive studies in this area. A short list of examples includes 
the following papers. Dewan and Min (1997) extends earlier works to show that 
IT capital is a net substitute for both ordinary capital and labor, suggesting that 
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the factor share of IT in production will grow to more significant levels over time. 
Dewan and Kraemer (2000) estimate an inter-country production function relating 
IT and non-IT inputs to GDP output.  Kudyba and Diwan (2002) re-examined the 
productivity paradox with updated data. Cheng and Nault (2007) estimate the 
effects to downstream productivity from information technology (IT) investments 
made upstream. Mittal and Nault (2009) studies the indirect impact of IT on the 
production function at the industry level. 
Cobb-Douglas function is an effective measure in IT production and information 
systems services (Gurbaxani and Mendelson 1987; Gurbaxani and Mendelson 
1992). In the production process of information system services, expenses on 
software and hardware were used to represent inputs to the system (personnel cost 
was enclosed in software expenses according to a proved ratio). Applying Cobb-
Douglas function to this production, the model showed that the budget spent on 
software and hardware remained constant overtime while project size increased 
(Gurbaxani and Mendelson 1987). Empirical tests to this model showed that 
software and hardware expenditures growed together with time exponentially at 
the same rate (Gurbaxani and Mendelson 1992). Another research about software 
development productivity also adopted the Cobb-Douglas function. They defined 
output as software development effort in forms of man-hours of the software 
developing process. Their inputs were software development team size as the 
number of team members and software size as the number of function points of 
the software (Pendharkar et al. 2008). The application of Cobb-Douglas function 
in firm-level evidence on information systems’ return to spending showed that IS 
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spending had made significant contribution to firm output (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
1996). In this famous research, they used firm’s total sales as output and computer 
capital, non-computer capital, IS staff labor and other labor and expenses as four 
inputs (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996). Some other production functions were also 
used in the IS field. A research into information system budgets using Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function used hardware and personnel 
expenses as inputs and information system services as output (Gurbaxani et al. 
2000). Their findings were consistent with the Cobb-Douglas model that the ratio 
of factor shares stayed constant over time and was independent of scale 
(Gurbaxani et al. 2000). In a research about software maintenance projects 
production, a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used to capture the 
relationship between inputs, measured by project team labors’ working hours and 
contextual variable used, and output, measured by function points of the 
enhancement in the project (Banker and Slaughter 1997). The production function 
in software development process was also used to estimate future project size 
(Pendharkar et al. 2008). In these researches, the production inputs were usually 
programming language, development tools and environment, and developers’ 
labor inputs. Outputs were usually software size, software efforts, and software 
productivity (Banker et al. 1991; Banker and Kemerer 1989; Banker and 
Slaughter 1997). Similar productivity analysis methods have been applied to 
study various issues in the IT/MIS area. Banker and Slaughter (1997) investigate 
the relationship between project size and software maintenance productivity by 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Gurbaxani et al. (1997, 2000) conducts 
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an empirical analysis of information systems budgeting for hardware and 
personnel to produce information services, based on the studies conducted by 
Gurbaxani and Mendelson (1987, 1990, 1992). Banker et al. (1994), Hu (1997), 
and Pendharkar (2006) study the production function of software development at 
project level. 
Economies of Scale 
The most important application of Cobb-Douglas production function is in 
studying economies of scale. When Cobb-Douglas function was firstly derived, 
they assumed unity elasticity of substitution, which means α+β=1. With empirical 
economic data gathered from the US, Australia, Canada, South Africa, Norwegian, 
etc., this assumption was proved to be applicable at that time (Douglas 1948; 
Griliches 1965; Griliches 1980, Moroney 1967; Walters 1963). This unity 
elasticity of substitution revealed constant returns to scale in these industries at 
that time. Later critiques were raised that the exponents of Labor and Capital 
should be independent to each other rather than unity substitution (Durand 1937). 
And if α+β>1, it means there exist economies of scale in the industry. Similarly, 
α+β<1 means diseconomies of scale (Wikipedia.org). And this improvement 
makes Cobb-Douglas a measurement of scale economies (Griliches and Ringstad 
1971). Economies of scale could be defined in two dimensions: The first 
dimension is to interpret it as a relationship between cost and size: Economies of 
scale mean the condition that at optimal size, firm will produce with lowest 
technical cost (Marshall 1997). Economies of scale are reductions of long-term 
average cost which are attributable to increases in scale (Pratten 1971). The other 
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explanation is from the angle of inputs and output. Economies of scale are: when 
inputs are increased by a proportion, output will increase by a larger ratio (Baye 
2009). And it is a theory of the relationship between “the scale of use of a 
properly chosen combination of all productive factors and services and the rate of 
output of the enterprise” (Stigler 1958). Economies of scale are affected by the 
size of firms, the scale of industry, the scale of a national economy, and of course 
the nature of the production process (Pratten 1971). Economies of scale stay 
consistent over time (Pratten 1971; Williamson 1968). What’s more, the 
magnitude of the economies of scales is expected to be increasing as the industry 
grows more mature (Pratten 1971).  
Economies of scales have many implications in firm management and 
government policy. Evaluation of economies of scale would provide important 
insights for cost control, management, and marketing (Pratten 1971). It could be 
used to estimate the optimal production size of an economy in varies industries 
(Stigler 1958) such as manufacturing industry (Pratten 1971), retailing industry 
(Tilley and Hicks 1970; Tucker 1972), and banking industry (Hughes et al. 2001; 
Wheelock and Wilson 2001). It could also be used to evaluate the development of 
an economy (Griliches and Ringstad 1971) and to estimate the total cost function 
and minimum cost output level (Turker 1975). It is also an important instrument 
in measuring of the performance and efficiency of particular economy activities 
(Turker 1975) such as R&D investment in drug industry (Henderson and 
Cockburn 1996; Macher and Boerner 2006). Investments in scale expansion could 
bring lower costs and lower prices for firms (Motta 2007). It is also a structural 
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instrument of industrial organization when analyzing entry barriers, concentration 
of industry, natural monopoly, etc. (Motta 2007; Pratten 1971; Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 1998; Turker 1975; Williamson 1968). Firms who reach integration 
may decrease their costs because of economies of scale and scope (Motta 2007).  
Applications of Economies of Scale 
In software industry, research in scale economy is also widely used. Pendharkar 
(2006) used economies of scale to forecast software size in development projects. 
Both economies and diseconomies of scale were discovered in an empirical 
analysis in software development (Banker and Kemerer1989). And spreading fix 
cost of project management, specialized personnel and development tools in 
software development projects would increase productivity of large scale 
development projects (Boehm 1981). However, average project productivity 
declined over the optimal software development project size was also disclosed in 
some research (Banker 1984; Banker et al. 1991). Possible explanation to this 
might be the increased technical complexity and the more frequent inter- and 
intra-project communication of large projects (Brooks 1995; Conte et al. 1986). 
Some researchers took a more microscopic view into the software development 
projects with output as software size measured by lines of codes (Pendharkar 
2006) or functional points (Banker and Kemerer 1989; Banker et al. 1991) and 
inputs as software labor measured by man-month (Boehm 1981) or software 
components (Pendharkar 2006). They concluded that non-linear variable returns 
to scale existed (Pendharkar 2006). In software maintenance projects, if batching 
smaller modifications into larger releases to utilize the scale economies of 
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maintenance, the IT maintenance cost at a large financial services organization 
would be reduced by 36%, investigated using Data Envelop Analysis (Banker et 
al. 1991; Banker and Slaughter 1997). In the information economics research, 
they called these above economic efficiency earned from firm scale supply-side 
economies of scale. Besides of supply-side economies of scale, demand-side 
economies of scale also play an important role in enhancing the positive feedback 
in the network economy. Demand-side economies of scale are the customer value 
of an IT product because it is widely used and becomes an industry standard. This 
attribute is a special norm of the information economy and is crucial in enlarging 
the customer base of the IT product (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Demand-side 
economies of scale and network externalities would increase the market share of 
software vendors, support a more profitable pricing of the software (Gallaugher 
and Wang 2002) and influence the customers’ choice of software adoptions (Au 
and Kauffman 2001). 
Economies of Scale and SaaS Business Model 
Although economies of scale of software development and maintenance have 
been investigated at the project level, the existing studies have not addressed 
issues related to the company as a whole rather than from the development or 
maintenance unit’s view. Even few researches looked into the production process 
of the new Software-as-a-Service business model. A lot of literatures about SaaS 
model’s multi-tenancy architecture claimed that this architecture would bring 
economies of scale to software companies (Carraro and Chong 2006;  Kwok et al. 
2008; Mietzner and Leymann 2008a; Mietzner and Leymann 2008b; Pinhenez 
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2008; Sääksjärvi et al. 2005; Sun et al. 2008; Walsh 2003). As SaaS is a bundle of 
both software application and hardware infrastructure renting service and other 
services (Fan et al. 2009; Ma and Seidmann 2008), this multi-tenancy feature 
spreads the cost of servers over the clients who share this server (Sääksjärvi et al. 
2005; SaaS EC of SIIA 2006; Wikipedia.org). So this relationship between cost 
and size gives great economies of scales for SaaS vendors. However, all of these 
findings in previous researches remain in descriptive level. And we will 
empirically test whether SaaS model really brings greater economies of scale to 
software vendors.  
3. Data Collection and Firm Categorization 
3.1. Data Collection 
The target industry in this study is the software industry, which is defined as the 
set of US firms with a Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code equal to 73721 
and publicly listed in New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. However as a 
consequence, we have to leave out some famous SaaS pioneers, such as Amazon, 
Sun Microsystems, HP, and IBM, whose SIC code is not 7372. Samples with 
missing values in important input and output variables are dropped. Microsoft is 
also dropped from the sample as a common practice in IS empirical research. 
Finally we get an unbalanced panel of 212 firms over the period 2002-2007 with 
803 data points overall. The number of firms increases with time. Multiple 
                                                 
1 SIC code 7372 stands for Prepackaged Software. It is used by US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and appears in a company’s Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval filing submitted to 
SEC, such as its Annual Reports (file 10-K). SIC code 7372 is consistent with NAICS code 511210, which 
stands for Software Publisher in the new NAICS codes system. 
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occurrences of the same firm during the investigation period are accounted using 
year dummies in the regression formula. An ending point 2007 was chosen 
because the complete financial statements of 2008 are still not completely 
available by the time of this research. 
3.2. Dummy Variable for Firm Categorization 
The most critical and unique independent variable of this research model is the 
business model of software companies: a pure-SaaS firm, a non-SaaS firm, or a 
mixed-SaaS firm. In our sample, we have 11 pure-SaaS firms, 57 mixed-SaaS 
firms, and 144 non-SaaS firms. We use two dummy variables in the model to 
measure this categorization.  
In this research, we identify SaaS companies by the following approach. First, we 
download annual reports (SEC form 10-K) of the 212 firms from 2002 to 2007 
(calendar year). All publicly listed software companies in the USA are required to 
submit annual reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
these reports are freely available from the website of SEC. We use a Java program 
to pick the reports that include a list of keywords that are related to SaaS2. The 
firms with zero key word in their annual reports are identified as non-SaaS firms. 
Next, researchers read and code each flagged 10K report to label that case as a 
pure-play SaaS, mixed-SaaS, or non-SaaS firm. General rules for this step are as 
follows: in the first section of annual report, firms describe their main business 
and details of every product of them. If they use the key words to describe their 
                                                 
2 This case-insensitive keyword list includes “on-demand”, “SaaS”, “Software-as-a-Service”, “Application 
Service Provider”, and variations with or without dashes. 
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main business and all of their products, they are labeled as pure-SaaS firms. If 
some of their products are SaaS product while the rest of them are non-SaaS 
products, they will be labeled as mixed-SaaS firms. Not all firms with key words 
in their annual reports are of SaaS business. In some cases our key words appear 
in some unexpected descriptions which are not related to the firm’s own business3, 
thus these firms will be labeled as non-SaaS firms and they composite our non-
SaaS group together with the firms not picked by the java program. Our result of 
pure-play SaaS firms is consistent with an industry report from the Software 
Equity Group and the result should be quite robust. A complete list of firm names 
is provided in Appendix 1 and short introductions to pure-SaaS firms are provided 
in Appendix 2. The controversial case is the definition of mixed-SaaS firms 
because we do not have access to the proportion of SaaS revenue in a software 
company. As a result, the categorization of mixed-SaaS firms is subjectively 
created. The other source of data limitations is that some firms do not mention 
their SaaS business in the annual report, or use a different name for SaaS services 
that is not captured by our keywords list. And we may underestimate the number 
of pure-SaaS firms because some of them report themselves to SEC with SIC 
code other than 73724. Also, we may underestimate the number of firms that are 
mixed-SaaS when those firms do not mention it in their annual reports. In both 
                                                 
3 For example, some firms said SaaS firms are their competitor, or their newly named CIO previously 
worked for an application service provider, or they planned to have SaaS business in the future beyond our 
sample period, etc. 
4 For example, SIC code of NetSuite Inc. is 7373, which stands for Computer Integrated System Design. 
SIC code for SoundBite Communications Inc. is 4899, which stands for Communication Services. SIC 
code for Salary.com Inc. and Athenahealth Inc. is 7370, which stands for Computer Programming, Data 
Processing etc. In concern of the consistency of our sample and work load to get complete data with 
various SIC code, we didn’t include them in our sample as well although they are pure-SaaS firms from the 
nature of their business. 
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cases we may only underestimate but not overestimate the number of firms 
because of this problem. As a consequence, our analysis is robust in the sense that 
including those few missing pure- and mixed-SaaS cases strengthens, but does not 
invalidate, the findings of the present study. 
4. Analysis of Firm Performance 
As we mentioned previously, lots of academic researchers and industry analysts 
suggest Software-as-a-Service to be a more advanced business model. It implies that 
firms with this new business model will demonstrate superiority over their 
conventional counterpart. We hypothesize that this superiority will be realized in 
financial performance. And we expect mixed-SaaS firms also benefit from their SaaS 
business. Previous research has devoted a lot into IT values and company 
performance for non-IT industry. Here in this research we build regression models 
with firm categorization as independent variable, time and firm size as control 
variables, and four performance indicators as output variables. We test our hypothesis 
using ordinary least square with unequal variance. Then we conclude with 
implications of our findings. 
4.1. Research Model 
To measure the performance of IT firms, we adopt four commonly used 
performance ratios as our dependent variables: (1) Price to Book Ratio (PBR), (2) 
Return on Asset (ROA), (3) Return on Equity (ROE), and (4) Debt Ratio (DR). 
These measures are well developed in finance and are widely used in investment 
evaluation. Also, IS researchers adopt them in measuring IT values (Alpar and 
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Kim 1990; Cron and Sobol 1983; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1994; Strassmann 1990; 
Weill 1992).  
To estimate the impact of SaaS business model on these ratios, we develop the 
following regression model: 
ܲܤܴ௜௧ ൌ ∑ ߪ௧ܦ௧ ൅ ߙ݌௜ ൅ βm୧ ൅ γ ln TA୧୲ ൅ u୧୲                             (1) ௧
ܴܱܣ௜௧ ൌ ∑ ߪ௧ܦ௧௧ ൅ ߙ݌௜ ൅ βm୧ ൅ γ ln TA୧୲ ൅ u୧୲                            (2) 
ܴܱܧ௜௧ ൌ ∑ ߪ௧ܦ௧௧ ൅ ߙ݌௜ ൅ βm୧ ൅ γ ln TA୧୲ ൅ u୧୲                            (3) 
ܦܴ௜௧ ൌ ∑ ߪ௧ܦ௧௧ ൅ ߙ݌௜ ൅ βm୧ ൅ γ ln TA୧୲ ൅ u୧୲                            (4) 
Where Dt are dummy variables used to control for years; pi and mi are dummy 
variables indicating pure- or mixed-SaaS firms respectively; and lnTAit is the 
logarithm of total asset of firm i at time t, which is also a control variable. As firm 
size has a relationship with IT investment (Harris and Katz 1991), in empirical 
research it is a common practice analyzing the relationship between accounting 
variables and financial ratios (Banz 1981; Dimson and Marsh 1986).  
We get pi and mi for each company in each year according to Section 3. Our time 
range from fiscal year 2002 to 2007 and we mark year 2002 as year 1. And we get 
all the financial ratios and firm information from the Compustat database of 
WRDS. Table 1 summarizes the definition and calculation of the rest variables. 
Table 2 illustrates summary statistics of our sample. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Performance Analysis5 
All Firms Total Asset PBR ROA ROE DR 
Mean 673.07 3.69 -0.13 0.54 0.46 
Std.Dev 2408.45 12.00 0.63 0.33 0.33 
Min 4.39 -104.15 -13.09 -2.72 0.04 
Max 35388.19 196.30 1.06 0.96 3.72 
Sample size =7706 
Pure-SaaS Total Asset PBR ROA ROE DR 
Mean 156.96 8.78 0.00 0.62 0.38 
Std.Dev 166.84 5.41 0.14 0.18 0.18 
Min 10.84 1.62 -0.62 0.22 0.09 
Max 815.75 23.10 0.19 0.91 0.78 
Sample size = 34 
Mixed-SaaS Total Asset PBR ROA ROE DR 
Mean 1040.35 3.52 -0.07 0.56 0.44 
Std.Dev 3559.88 4.12 0.34 0.24 0.24 
                                                 
5 To make the data easier to understand, we still run summary statistics on Total Asset rather than logarithm 
of Total Asset. 
6 33 data items only exist in one year and is automatically dropped from the regression model. 
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Min 6.30 -11.50 -3.26 -0.69 0.04 
Max 35388.19 36.13 0.43 0.96 1.69 
Sample size =250 
Non-SaaS Total Asset PBR ROA ROE DR 
Mean 520.24 3.41 -0.18 0.53 0.47 
Std.Dev 1605.49 14.69 0.75 0.38 0.38 
Min 4.39 -104.15 -13.09 -2.72 0.05 
Max 14865.71 196.30 1.06 0.95 3.72 
Sample size =486 
 
4.2. Data Analysis 
We use ordinary least square (OLS) assuming unequal variance to perform data 
analysis. The results are illustrated in Table 3. 
Table 3. Results of OLS Assuming Unequal Variance 
 PBR ROA ROE DR 
p 5.505*** 0.125*** 0.116*** -0.116*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
m 0.200 0.056* 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.706) (0.079) (0.972) (0.939) 
lnTA -0.094 0.074*** 0.058*** -0.058*** 
 (0.816) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 2.293 -0.742*** 0.255*** 0.745*** 
 (0.276) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 770 770 770 770 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All results on year dummy variables are omitted for brevity. 
 
As shown in Table 3, pure-SaaS business model has significant advantage over 
non-SaaS firms in all four ratios. Mixed-SaaS firms also demonstrate better 
performance than conventional non-SaaS firms but it’s only significant to the 10% 
level in terms of return on asset.  
We also run another regression with standard OLS (assuming equal variance) as 
robustness check. The results are provided in Table 4. 
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 Table 4. Robust Check of Standard OLS Assuming Equal Variance
 PBR ROA ROE DR 
p 5.505** 0.125 0.116** -0.116** 
 (0.011) (0.254) (0.044) (0.044) 
m 0.200 0.056 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.832) (0.243) (0.977) (0.949) 
lnTA -0.094 0.074*** 0.058*** -0.058*** 
 (0.729) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 2.293 -0.742*** 0.255*** 0.745*** 
 (0.159) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 770 770 770 770 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All results on year dummy variables are omitted for brevity. 
 
This equal variance assumption makes the relationship between pure-SaaS model 
and return on asset and the relationship between mixed-SaaS model and return on 
asset not significant anymore. And it also reduced the significant level positive 
relationship between pure-SaaS and return on equity from 1% to 5%, and negative 
relationship between pure-SaaS and debt ratio from 1% to 5%.  
Based on the regressions we did, we can conclude with the same results as the 
original model: pure-SaaS firms have significant superiority over non-SaaS firms 
in Price to Book Ratio, Return on Asset, Return on Equity and Debt Ratio. Also, 
Mixed-SaaS firms have significant better financial performance than non-SaaS 
firms in Return on Asset. 
4.3. Discussion and Implications 
4.3.1. Discussion 
As a conclusion from the data analysis, Software-as-a-Service business 
model does lead to better financial performance. One of the most significant 
findings is the advantage of SaaS in price to book ratio. Referring to Table 2, 
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the cross-sectional average price to book ratio of pure-SaaS firm is 8.78, 
while it is 3.52 for mixed-SaaS firm and 3.41 for non-SaaS firm. This result 
is consistent with the software equity annual report published by Software 
Equity Group LLC. They disclosed in their 2007 annual report7 that 
investors favor SaaS firms with remarkably higher valuations on an 
enterprise value to revenue (7.5×) and enterprise value to EBITDA (65.2×), 
while the same measurements for shrink-wrap software providers are 2.3× 
and 15.2× respectively. Also in mergers and acquisition cases involving 
pure-SaaS firms as target firms, the acquirer would pay averagely 5.2 times 
higher than the firm’s revenue as exit valuation. Similar results could also be 
found in their reports of 2006 and 2008.  
There are various explanations for SaaS firms to have better operation 
performance. Higher price to book ratio of pure-SaaS firms generally results 
from the equity market. As for the stock market, the stock price of some 
leading SaaS firms, like Salesforce.com, Taleo, kept growing in a fast pace 
before the big market failure on November 17, 2008. Even after November 
17, in a weak global economy, the firms’ stock prices are gradually climbing 
up (Source of stock prices are from Yahoo!Finance). Investors’ positive 
attitude to SaaS is mainly because of the firms’ steady increase in revenue 
growth and bullish prospect. Customers’ convince in future adoption of SaaS 
guarantees board space for market growth (Akella et al. 2007). What’s more, 
with the development of technology and the participation of big names in the 
                                                 
7 The annual reports on software equity of SoftwareEquity Group LLC are publicly available upon 
registration through their website: http://www.softwareequity.com/ 
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software industry such as Microsoft, Google, SAP, etc., large clients also 
open their gate wide to SaaS, which creates another source of confidence for 
the investors. And higher stock price will definitely lead to higher PB ratio. 
The higher ROA and ROE and the lower debt of pure-SaaS firms could be 
generally explained from within the firms. Investigating into the SaaS 
business model itself, we may find an answer from its innovation in software 
delivery and payment model. Internet delivery with thin-client architecture 
raises the passion of small and medium size businesses who cannot afford 
the high investment for purchasing conventional packaged software, so these 
SMEs choose to “rent” the software through SaaS providers. Specially, for 
mixed-SaaS firms, they could cover both large and small clients with 
different models at the same time. So a continually growing customer base 
gives SaaS companies enduring revenue boosts and ability of debt coverage. 
Payment model might be another important contributor. The way how 
clients make payment to SaaS is at the same time how SaaS vendors realize 
their revenue. Although the recurring fee model reduces the initial turnover 
for SaaS vendors, it promises smoother cash flow for a longer time. In 
another word, it moves today’s revenue to the future which is worth more. 
So it is easy to understand that under the generally acceptable accounting 




Previously, profound achievements have been reached in how IT affects 
their clients’ business model and business performance. Nevertheless, this 
research is among the pioneer of studies into how a technology innovation 
(SaaS) affects the vendor’s business model and business performance. Also, 
we use academic models to test performance ratios, which is more reliable 
and rigorous than simple statistics used in commercial market research firms. 
Therefore, our findings on the better performance of SaaS business model 
would contribute to the academic research in SaaS and introduce a new 
angle of view to this field. 
Also, we are expecting the industry could find inspiration and enlightenment 
in their practice of Software-as-a-Service. For those who intend to start SaaS 
business or transform their conventional software business to this new model, 
they may find positive message through our findings.  
5. Analysis of Firm Productivity 
Besides studying the performance of Software-as-a-Service business, we also go in-
depth with the inside mechanism of SaaS by investigating the productivity of the 
three groups of firms. In this section, we will analyze the productivity of pure-, 
mixed-, and non-SaaS firms from three aspects: economies of scale, marginal product 
of input factors, and total factor productivity. We use two augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production functions to run the productivity analysis. In the first model, we use 
capital (K), labor (L), and intangible asset (I) as production inputs. In the second case, 
our independent variables include cost-of-goods-sold (C), research and development 
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expenses (R), and selling and general administrative expenses (S). In both case, we 
use economic value added as production output. Our baseline regression method is 
ordinary least square (OLS) with panel-corrected standard error (PCSE). Then we run 
several robustness tests with a reduced sample with lower average firm size and also 
three other regression models: Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS), fix effect 
and random effect panel-data regressions. Finally we present the discussion and 
implications of our findings. 
5.1. Research Model 
5.1.1. Empirical Models 
In section 4, we test the superiority of SaaS model in firm performance. Now 
in this section, we are implying that the superiority of SaaS model will also 
be realized in firm productivity. To prove this, we apply production theory 
and build empirical analysis based on our firm categorization. We would like 
to find out the contribution of SaaS business model to the productivity of 
different firms and the relationship between production input and output 
variables. We intend to evaluate productivity from aspects of economies of 
scale, marginal product of input factors and total factor productivity.  
Typical production theory composes a production output and several inputs. 
Usually inputs will cover capital input and labor input and other important 
factors. Formally, we consider the two models using same output variable 
and different sets of input variables. The two sets of input variables are 
composed of capital and labor measurement derived from balance sheet and 
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income statement respectively. In the first one, we abstract data from 
balance sheet: 
Model 1: Balance Sheet Model 
ln Y୧୲ ൌ α଴ ൅ ∑ α୧୬୧ୀଵ ൅ ∑ β଴୲




Mm୧൯ ln K୧୲ ൅ ൫βL
N ൅ βL
Pp୧ ൅ βL




Mm୧ሻ ln I୧୲ ൅ u୧୲                                                                                                           
(5) 
Similarly, we have the following model using the inputs from the income 
statement. 
Model 2: Income Statement Model 
ln Y୧୲ ൌ α଴ ൅ ∑ α୧୬୧ୀଵ ൅ ∑ β଴୲




Mm୧൯ ln C୧୲ ൅ ൫βR
N ൅ βR
Pp୧ ൅ βR




Mm୧ሻ ln S୧୲ ൅ u୧୲                                                                                                                  
(6) 
where the superscripts of the beta coefficients indicate that a firm is a non-
SaaS firm (N), a pure-SaaS firm (P), or a mixed-SaaS firm (M), pi and mi 
are dummy variables for indicating pure- or mixed-SaaS firms respectively 
from our results in section 3, and αi is a dummy variable for each company, 
Dt is a dummy variable for fiscal year. Intuitively, (5) and (6) are simply 
standard regression equations with two dummy variables on the intercept 
and all coefficient terms of the three independent variables. Bear in mind 
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that the coefficient of the multiplicative terms (e.g., pilnKit) indicates the 
difference of the productivity of that input factor between a non-SaaS and 
SaaS firm. Also note that we allow the intercept term to vary across each 
category-year pair so that we can compare the time series of TFP (e.g., three 
categories of firms) from 2002 to 2007. The explanations to dependent and 
independent variables will be covered in the next section. 
5.1.2. Variable Constructions 
Dependent Variables 
The standard output measurement used in the literature is economic value 
added, which is defined as the additional value of the final product over the 
cost of input materials used to produce it from the previous stage of 
production. The software business is unique in that the “input materials from 
the previous stage” are not really well-defined. In this paper, we use a simple 
definition: output (equivalently, value-added) is operationalized as the total 
annual sales minus the cost-of-goods-sold (COGS) with total sales deflated 
by PPI in the software industry and COGS deflated by PPI for intermediate 
goods. 
Independent Variables 
This study considers two sets of three key input factors as the independent 
variables. One set of variables is obtained from the balance sheet and the 
other set is obtained from the income statement. The input factors from the 
balance sheet are fixed assets (a typical measure of “capital” in the literature), 
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number of employees (a typical measure of “labor” in the literature), and 
intangible asset. The first two variables are standard inputs in the 
productivity analysis literature and the last input is important for the 
production of software products or services. 
The input factors from the income statement are cost of goods sold (COGS), 
research and development expenses (R&D), and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (SG&A). The construction of the three variables as 
indicated in their annual reports are: Cost of goods sold for pure-SaaS firms 
usually composite of the expenses on hosting service and providing support, 
the costs of maintaining infrastructures used for on-demand applications, and 
other related costs and allocated overhead. For non-SaaS firms, cost of 
goods sold includes the cost happened in manufacturing, packaging, 
shipping, and storage of products and other related costs and allocated 
overhead. And COGS in mixed-SaaS firms is a combination of these two. 
The construction of COGS makes it similar to the fix asset concept as we 
used in balance sheet model. So it is also regarded as a capital input in Cobb-
Douglas production function. R&D expenses and SG&A expenses in all the 
three types of firms are indifference. R&D expenses are consisted by salaries 
and expenses on R&D staffs and costs of infrastructures used in R&D 
function.  SG&A expenses are the expenses on the salaries and benefits of 
staff in sales, marketing, finance, human resources, and other functions, as 
well as expenses for their job functions such as promotion and branding 
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activities. As both are expenses on functional staff, we could regard them as 
measures of labor input in terms of dollar value.  
There are several reasons that we investigate the second model using input 
factors from the income statement. First, “labor” is clearly more important 
than capital inputs in conventional software companies and deserves deeper-
level investigation. Also, employees working at software companies may 
have very different job functions. In balance sheet model, employees from 
all functions are treated as a whole measured by headcount.  Although we do 
not have access to the subcategory of employees to differentiate between 
software developers and marketing managers, expenses generated by each 
function could be regarded as the proxy variable for the staff in that function. 
With this approach, we can examine the source of efficiency differences in 
labor productivity between SaaS and non-SaaS firms.  
The data source used in this section is also Compustat. The variable 
construction process is provided in Table 5 and Table 6 and summary 
statistics to variables are in Table 7. 
Table 5. Data Sources, Construction Procedures, and Deflators for 
Productivity Analysis 
Variable 
Name Construction Process Source Deflator Notation
Output 
Total Revenue (revt) 
minus Cost of Goods 
Sold (cogs),  converted 




Index for software 
(SIC code = 7372 
or NAICS code = 







Fix Asset (Total Asset 
(at) minus Total 
Current Asset (act) 
minus Intangible Asset 
(intan)), converted to 







(Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2009) 
K 




(intan), converted to 













Cost of Goods Sold 
(cogs), converted to 












Sales and General 
Administrative 
Expenses (xsga) minus 
R&D Expense (xrd), 













R&D Expenses (xrd), 












Table 6. Model Constructions for Productivity Analysis 
Inputs Balance Sheet Model Income Statement Model 
Capital Fixed Asset Cost of Goods Sold 
Labor Number of Employees R&D Expenses; 




Other Intangible Asset - 
 
 
Table 7. Summary Statistics for Productivity Analysis 






Mean 314.38 323.13 1.62 228.25 85.21 186.87 58.74
Std.Dev 1141.74 1462.06 5.53 1254.00 272.86 492.81 168.85
Min 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.10 0.16










Mean 91.62 56.24 0.62 25.96 24.44 65.23 10.48
Std.Dev 113.67 64.94 0.54 39.83 24.09 80.56 9.25
Min 7.00 1.03 0.06 0.00 1.24 6.64 1.28










Mean 576.13 487.76 2.89 356.95 122.36 305.69 96.33
Std.Dev 1852.59 2064.50 9.11 1816.64 397.07 739.64 250.98
Min 2.89 1.69 0.05 0.00 1.06 6.15 0.18
Max 17990.08 21835.31 84.23 19754.72 3528.54 6160.16 2070.11
Sample Size=256 






Mean 198.94 259.46 1.05 178.03 70.88 135.91 43.30
Std.Dev 530.80 1098.84 2.34 899.41 192.47 311.77 110.55
Min 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.10 0.16
Max 5334.04 11622.54 17.60 10796.97 1515.15 2737.29 960.56
Sample Size=511 
 
5.2. Data Analysis 
To find a proper regression model for the production estimation, we consider 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in our cross-sectional time-series data set. 
The reasons to consider heteroskedasticity are that our firms different in size. 
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And because of their different business model, they have differences in 
production cycle as well. These variances are likely to cause panel-level 
heteroskedasticity. According to a Breusch-Pagan test for panel-level 
heteroskedasticity of our sample, the null hypothesis that errors are 
homoskedastic could be rejected (For balance sheet model, χ2=3.1e+31, p<0.001; 
for income statement model, χ2 = 2.0e+31, p<0.001). Autocorrelation is common 
in any industry section with business cycles because one year’s output is highly 
correlated with previous year’s output. It will be more significant in SaaS 
business model because of its recurring payment model. Therefore, our data set 
might have heteroskedasticity across firm categories and autocorrelation across 
time periods. We ran Wooldridge test and proved that autocorrelation did exist in 
our panel data (For balance sheet model, F=19.171, p<0.001; for income 
statement data, F=21.832, p<0.001). In this case, pooled OLS may be 
problematic that the standard errors will not be correct although the estimators 
would still be unbiased and consistent. And Beck and Katz (1995)’s Monte Carlo 
analysis shows that PCSE may work well with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. So we choose PCSE with heteroskedasticity and a cross-
categories common autocorrelation coefficient. Also, PCSE has been widely used 
in studying production function by researchers in the IS literature (e.g., Han 
2006).  
The results of our estimations on economies of scale comparison are reported in 
Table 8. Detailed coefficient of each variable are presented in Table 9 and 10. 
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Estimates of the intercept terms are reported separately in Table 11 for 
computing total factor productivities.  
5.2.1. Economies of Scale 
Based on Table 9 and 10, we can calculate the economies of scale of three 
types of firms, defined as the sum of the coefficients of the three input 
factors. The results are as follows: 
 
Table 8. Economies of Scale (PCSE) 
  Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
BS Model         
Non-SaaS 0.935 0.041  0.855  1.015  
Pure-SaaS 0.844 0.068  0.712  0.977  
Mixed-SaaS 1.058 0.029  1.000  1.115  
IN Model         
Non-SaaS 1.101 0.021  1.060  1.143  
Pure-SaaS 0.917 0.043 0.833  1.001  
Mixed-SaaS 1.113 0.018  1.079  1.148  
 
Telling from the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals in Table 8, we 
find that pure-SaaS firms generally have smaller economies of scales than 
the other two cases while mixed-SaaS firms have the largest economies of 
scale among the three types of firms.  
5.2.2. Marginal Product of Input Factors 
Table 9. PCSE Estimates of BS Model
Coefficient Est. Full Sample  
K 0.186***  
 (0.000)  
p*K 0.124  
 (0.111)  
m*K 0.005  
50 
 
 (0.937)  
L 0.744***  
 (0.000)  
p*L -0.253*  
 (0.061)  
m*L 0.121  
 (0.235)  
I 0.005  
 (0.654)  
p*I 0.038  
 (0.255)  
m*I -0.003  
 (0.850)  
N 803  
p-values in parentheses: 
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 10. PCSE Estimates of IN Model




















p-values in parentheses: 




In original Cobb-Douglas function, marginal product is the coefficient of 
input factors. Here in our model with dummy variables, the coefficients in 
Tables 9 and 10 for pure- and mixed-SaaS firms are incremental values. For 
example, the marginal product of capital for the pure-SaaS firm is the sum of 
two values, 0.186+0.124. As a consequence, the p-value under 0.124 
indicates whether the coefficient of pure-SaaS firms is significantly 0.124 
greater than that of non-SaaS firms. Specifically, the beta coefficient 
measures the percentage change in the output when the input is increased by 
one percent (output elasticity). Most of coefficients of the base line case 
(non-SaaS firms) are significant at 1% level, except for the coefficient of 
R&D expenses which is significant at 10% and for the intangible asset which 
is not statistically significant.  
Capital: Both pure- and mixed-SaaS firms have larger coefficients than 
those of non-SaaS firms but neither of them is statistically significant. The 
result in Table 9 indicates that fix assets used in SaaS model contribute more 
to output for pure-SaaS firms. And it is consistent with the marginal product 
of cost-of-goods-sold in Table 10. As we mentioned, cost-of-goods-sold 
could be regarded as a measurement of capital in income statement. The 
marginal product of COGS for pure-SaaS is 200% higher than non-SaaS 
firms (0.124 versus 0.124+0.249) and it is significant at the 10% level. Also, 
the capital productivity of pure-SaaS firms is higher in the case of pure-SaaS 
with p value 0.111. Although the numbers are still not significant here, they 
still make sense because the limitations of our pure-SaaS sample will only 
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underestimate these effects as we mentioned in section 3. Marginal product 
of capital gains in productivity at least 67% for pure-SaaS firms higher than 
non-SaaS firms (0.186 versus 0.186+0.124).  
For mixed-SaaS, neither the capital productivity in Table 9 nor COGS 
productivity in Table 10 is significant. They two also lead to different 
directions (2.6% higher for capital productivity of mixed-SaaS firms over 
non-SaaS firms (0.186 versus 0.181+0.005 in full sample) but 14.8% lower 
for COGS productivity (0.124 versus 0.124-0.018)). So we cannot make a 
concrete conclusion about the capital productivity in mixed-SaaS firms here.  
Labor: Our results suggest that the output elasticity for employees in pure-
SaaS firms is lowest whereas the output elasticity for employees in mixed-
SaaS firms is highest among the three types of firms. And the pure-SaaS 
case is significant at 10% level. Due to the opposite sign of the results in the 
pure- and mixed-SaaS firms, we can conclude that the productivity gain of 
the mixed-SaaS firm is not a manifest of using SaaS business delivery model. 
Otherwise, the labor productivity of the mixed-SaaS firms should be smaller 
than non-SaaS firms.  
As the elements used in our income statement describe expenses on different 
functional staff, we can examine the results of income statement model to 
shed more light on the findings of Model 1 and can further delve into the 
cause of the differences in labor productivity. 
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Table 10 shows that pure-SaaS firms have lower productivity both in R&D 
and SG&A, which together contribute to the 36.9% lower labor productivity 
identified in balance sheet model (36.9% is derived by the productivity loss 
of 0.253/0.744 in Table 8). The differences in R&D are not significant while 
the differences in SG&A coefficients are significant at 5% level.  
For mixed-SaaS firms, none of the figures is significant. The results of 
income statement model suggest that their higher $&D and SG&A 
productivity contribute to their higher labor productivity. So it may be a sign 
that in our observations, most of the Mixed-SaaS firms easily keep two 
business models. 
Intangible asset: Our estimation of intangible asset here is not rigorous 
because none of the input coefficients is significant. Based on what we have, 
pure-SaaS firms have 860% advantages in marginal product of intangible 
asset over non-SaaS firms (0.005 versus 0.005+0.038) while mixed-SaaS 
firms have 60% less marginal product of intangible asset than non-SaaS 
firms (0.005 versus 0.005-0.003).  
5.2.3. Total Factor Productivity 
Cobb-Douglas function captures two source of production growth: one from 
the growth of each factor, and another from the growth of total factor 
productivity (TFP). Total factor productivity is defined as the measure of 
effects other than the input variables, such as the growth of technology, the 
macro economy etc. Undoubtedly, Software-as-a-Service is a great 
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technology innovation and may affect every aspect of the production. So we 
can figure out the impacts of SaaS on factors beyond our production inputs 
by examining the total factor productivity of our production function. 
However, restricted by the relatively smaller sample size, shorter time period 
and younger stage of SaaS development, analysis in this section is more like 
a pilot study for completeness of the research. In the future with the maturity 
of the SaaS industry, researchers could conduct more rigorous investigations 
with larger sample size and detailed data. 
The intercept term in our regression formula is just the logarithms of TFP in 
Cobb-Douglas function. We present the estimated intercept terms, calculated 
TFP and the annual growth rate of TFP in Table 11 as follows: 
 
Table 11. Total Factor Productivity (PCSE) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.096 3.321 4.175 -0.032 0.817 0.055 
2003 4.249 3.822 4.225 0.241 1.038 0.229 
2004 4.343 3.704 4.365 0.322 1.131 0.367 
2005 4.380 3.727 4.434 0.402 1.208 0.534 
2006 4.452 3.623 4.480 0.490 1.218 0.518 
2007 4.534 3.750 4.546 0.595 1.277 0.578 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 60.10 27.69 65.02 0.969 2.264 1.057 
2003 70.04 45.70 68.38 1.273 2.824 1.258 
2004 76.94 40.61 78.65 1.380 3.100 1.444 
2005 79.84 41.55 84.27 1.495 3.348 1.706 
2006 85.80 37.45 88.24 1.633 3.381 1.679 
2007 93.13 42.52 94.26 1.814 3.587 1.783 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
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  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 16.53% 65.04% 5.16% 31.39% 24.73% 19.04% 
2004 9.86% -11.13% 15.03% 8.44% 9.75% 14.80% 
2005 3.77% 2.33% 7.14% 8.33% 8.00% 18.18% 
2006 7.47% -9.88% 4.71% 9.20% 1.01% -1.59% 
2007 8.55% 13.54% 6.82% 11.07% 6.08% 6.18% 
 
Firstly we compare the total factor productivity of non-SaaS firms and 
mixed-SaaS firms. In both model in most of years, mixed-SaaS firms have 
larger TFP than non-SaaS firms (except in 2003 in both model and in 2007 
in income statement model). However it is not proper for us to make a 
conclusion here because the disparities are not very salient and consistent, 
and we do not know the proportional revenue contribution of SaaS and non-
SaaS sectors within mixed-SaaS firms. In sum, in this study we cannot 
conclude that using a dual-model approach in mixed-SaaS firms improves 
their TFP. 
Then we come to the total factor productivity of pure-SaaS firms. It shows 
sharply contrasting results in the two models: in balance sheet model, pure-
SaaS firms obviously have least TFP among the three categories; while in 
income statement model, pure-SaaS firms exhibit largest TFP. This 
contradictory finding may imply that using input factors from the balance 
sheet (or income statement) for productivity analysis may underestimate (or 
overestimate) the productivity of pure-SaaS firms.  
We also calculate the annual growth rate of TFP for each category. Because 
of the limitation of our smaller sample size and shorter time period, we do 
not find stable result about the growth pattern of pure-SaaS firms. And the 
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horizontal and vertical comparison of these numbers also cannot give 
consistent results about cross-category comparison and growth pattern of 
each category.  
5.3. Discussion and Implications 
5.3.1. Discussion 
We analyze the productivity of SaaS business from three aspects: economies 
of scale, marginal product of input factors and total factor productivity. 
Based on our findings, we conclude that SaaS model does influence the 
productivity in varies aspects. Below are a summary of all the significant 
findings we get and some possible explanations: 
Economies of Scale:  
Mixed-SaaS firms have the largest economies of scale among the three 
categories, and pure-SaaS firms perform worst in economies of scale. The 
result is consistent in both balance sheet model and income statement model.  
For mixed-SaaS firms, a possible explanation could be that the mixed-SaaS 
firms have much greater bargaining power than pure-SaaS firms and thus 
can appropriate more values created by the SaaS business model. It is also 
possible that the synergy of the mixed-SaaS firm dominates the 
diseconomies of scale in the SaaS model, leading to increased economies of 
scale. Also, most of the mixed-SaaS firms are initially non-SaaS firms. They 
have been exist and well operating for a long time. They have already set up 
a good status in the market and obtained positive word of mouth of their 
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product. When they start a new SaaS business, their new business will also 
benefit from these operating experiences and market advantages. So it is 
possible for them to manage their inputs and output more efficiently.  
For pure-SaaS firms, it proves that hosting servers and data centers for 
clients indeed gives SaaS vendors non-negligible variable cost as well as 
capacity constrains to the scale of the company. This finding is contradicted 
to the description in previous research and non-academic articles. 
Comparing to mixed- and non-SaaS firms, pure-SaaS firms are young firms 
with less operating experience and market awareness. And it is 
understandable for them to be less efficient in their early stage of growth.  
Also, there are two countervailing effects of the multi-tenant model as one of 
the three prominent features of SaaS, both increases and decreases 
economies of scale. First, in the SaaS model, the fixed costs of the 
centralized IT infrastructure are indirectly shared among all customers and 
this cost-sharing is the main source of economies of scale mentioned in 
industry press articles. Infrastructure cost-sharing and CPU time-sharing 
increase economies of scale of SaaS vendors and buyers as a group. The 
second effect is that when the IT infrastructure and staff are centralized at 
the SaaS vendors, all costs are transferred to SaaS vendors from their clients. 
As a consequence, the cost function of SaaS vendors has a significant 
variable cost component. As a result, SaaS firms may not have zero variable 
cost anymore, eliminating the famous zero variable cost feature that makes 
conventional software companies have huge (supply-side) economies of 
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scale. At the same time, the centralized infrastructure also imposes capacity 
constraints on SaaS firms: there is a limit on the CPU processing power, 
memory or hard-disk storage space, and physical space for storing and 
cooling the hardware. The limited CPU processing power is an important 
source (it is the most expensive input) of congestion cost for the customers 
and is an example of demand-side diseconomies of scale. Therefore, the 
centralized IT infrastructure destroys both supply-side and demand-side the 
economies of scale in the traditional software business. Telling from our 
empirical result, the second effect dominates the first one and leads to 
smaller economies of scale for pure-SaaS firms.   
Marginal Product: 
Capital: Pure-SaaS firms have 66.7% larger marginal product of capital than 
non-SaaS firms in balance sheet model to a p value equal to 0.111, and 201% 
to a 10% significant level larger marginal product of cost of goods sold than 
non-SaaS firms.  
The composition of COGS is different among pure-, mixed- and non-SaaS 
firms. In pure-SaaS firms it composites the expenses on hosting service and 
infrastructures, while in non-SaaS firms it composites of the cost of 
computer infrastructures, manufacturing, packaging, delivery and storage of 
the packaged product. The most important capital, or fix asset in software 
companies are computer infrastructures. In conventional non-SaaS business, 
the devices are mostly used to support R&D and back office functions. 
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Studies have shown that the traditional software delivery model leads to 
overbuilding of IT assets (Carr 2005): the utilization rate of the computing 
power of servers is around 10% to 35% while that of desktop computers is 
only 5%. In contrast in a SaaS delivery model, because several firms operate 
on the same infrastructure, the under-utilization of processing power and 
storage can be alleviated. What’s more, some of the devices used as SaaS 
application servers directly serve the clients and generate revenue. So pure-
SaaS firms improve the utilization rate of infrastructures and will have larger 
capital productivity.  
Labor:  Our two models give consistent results about labor productivity: 
pure-SaaS firms have the smallest marginal product of labor in balance sheet 
model and R&D and SG&A in income statement model. The result of labor 
productivity in balance sheet model and the result of SG&A expenses 
productivity in income statement model are both significant to an acceptable 
level. 
There are several potential factors contributing to this observation. First, 
sales and marketing costs remain relatively high for SaaS firms as generally 
acceptable accounting principles (GAAP) force recognition of expenses in 
advance of subscription revenue, contributing to low SG&A productivity. 
Also, the SaaS model is relatively new and market acceptance among 
customers was still relatively low from 2002 to 2007, leading to lower 
marketing and sales productivity. Another explanation of this finding could 
be that SaaS firms are typically younger and smaller and their employees 
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may lack experience in efficiently operating the SaaS model. That is, the 
learning-by-doing benefit in SaaS firms is much smaller than in non-SaaS 
firms. Lastly, a related potential cause is that SaaS firms are less reputable 
compared with well-established software companies. Therefore, they may 
not be able to attract talented staff from large companies such as Oracle or 
Adobe.  
Intangible Asset: Neither observation is significant.  
As described in the annual reports of the sample companies, typical 
intangible asset includes copyrights and patent rights. SaaS is a survivability 
in pure-SaaS firms so the patent right is crucial to them, while  in mixes-
SaaS firms, the SaaS product may not be in a dominant position and 
contribute less to their revenue comparing to other products in their product 
range. We hope future research could find a better way to evaluate intangible 
asset for SaaS firms. 
Total Factor Productivity 
Limited by our smaller sample size and shorter time period, we do not get 
stable results on total factor productivity and annual growth rate of TFP of 
these three groups. However one phenomenon is obvious: balance sheet 
model and income statement model give different ranking of pure-SaaS 
firms in TFP: the TFP of pure-SaaS firms is lowest in balance sheet model 
while highest in income statement model. 
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One potential explanation is from the accounting rules about depreciation 
and expense recognition: with a recurring subscription fee model, a young 
pure-SaaS company may exhibit that data pattern in comparison of balance 
sheet and income statement. In the early years of new firms, the book value 
of assets is relatively larger before they depreciated. However, part of the 
revenue generated in this year will only be realized in the future and 
distributed to the following several years due to the pricing model. Therefore, 
the TFP is underestimated in balance sheet model.  
5.3.2. Implications 
Our results have several contributions to the literature of Software-as-a-
Service. First, this is a first academic work to the productivity of SaaS 
vendors with empirical analysis. Previous research works either remain as 
simple description of good market performance of SaaS companies, or 
describe the benefits of SaaS from client’s view, or do theoretical modeling 
without empirical support. Second, our firm categorization model is an 
innovation to the literature. Previously works only separate SaaS and non-
SaaS but never look into firms with dual models. Our categorization 
methodology and results will also benefit future research. Last but not least, 
our finding about relatively lower economies of scale of pure-SaaS firm 
refreshes the existing misunderstanding to the scale economy of SaaS 
business. And our research about input factors’ marginal product and total 




Practically, from our research findings SaaS firms may get a good 
understanding of the advantage and disadvantage of their business model 
and make improvements accordingly. The findings on economies of scale 
indicate that mixed-SaaS could grow larger while pure-SaaS firms are most 
probably to stay in a niche market. So for pure-SaaS vendors, it may be good 
for them to consider how to improve their efficiency of using production 
inputs, especially improve the efficiency of R&D and SG&A expenses. Also, 
our findings could be reference for those who want to start SaaS business 
and survive in the competition. 
5.4. Robustness Check 
5.4.1. A Reduced Sample 
We dropped more items with extremely large firm size as measured by total 
asset. After that, we get a smaller sample size of 664 observations of 180 
distinct firms, including 11 pure-SaaS firms, 47 mixed-SaaS firms and 122 
non-SaaS firms. Coincidently, this control does not influent our pure-SaaS 
sample but only affects the mixed- and non-SaaS groups. As shown in Table 
12, we narrow the gap in total asset between different firm groups: the mean 
and variance of total asset of the three groups become similar. 
Table 12. Comparison of Total Asset 
Full Sample All Firms Pure-SaaS Mixed- SaaS Non- SaaS
No. of Obs. 803 36 256 511
Mean 763.84 196.63 1210.48 580.04
Std. Dev. 2923.46 214.73 4411.07 1884.49
Min 5.49 10.84 6.59 5.49
Max 47268 1089.59 47268 18092.09
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Reduced Sample All Firms Pure- SaaS Mixed- SaaS Non- SaaS
No. of Obs. 664 36 205 423
Mean 217.83 196.63 250.30 203.89
Std. Dev. 266.46 214.73 294.75 254.91
Min 6 11 7 6
Max 1549 1090 1511 1549
 
Based on this reduced sample, we build exactly the same two models and do 
PCSE regression. The results on economies of scale, marginal product of 
input factors and total factor productivity are listed in the following tables. 
 
Table 13. Reduced Sample Economies of Scales (PCSE) 
  Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
BS Model         
Non-SaaS 0.857  0.056  0.748  0.966  
Pure-SaaS 0.842  0.071  0.703  0.981  
Mixed-SaaS 0.956  0.046  0.867  1.046  
IN Model         
Non-SaaS 1.1217780  0.045  1.033  1.211  
Pure-SaaS 0.9201651  0.047  0.829  1.012  
Mixed-SaaS 1.0674780  0.029  1.011  1.124  
 
 
Table 14. Marginal Product of Reduced Sample  
BS Model Small Sample IN Model Small Sample 
K 0.153*** C 0.075* 
 (0.000)  (0.075) 
p*K 0.157* p*C 0.258 
 (0.058)  (0.114) 
m*K 0.014 m*C 0.018 
 (0.827)  (0.734) 
L 0.692*** R 0.157* 
 (0.000)  (0.078) 
p*L -0.206 p*R -0.135 
 (0.160)  (0.246) 
m*L 0.087 m*R -0.053 
 (0.478)  (0.569) 
I 0.011 S 0.890*** 
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 (0.317)  (0.000) 
p*I 0.035 p*S -0.325* 
 (0.335)  (0.054) 
m*I -0.001 m*S -0.019 
 (0.940)  (0.870) 
N 664  664 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 15. Total Factor Productivity (Reduced Sample, PCSE) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.132 3.311 4.123 -0.108 0.789 0.187 
2003 4.221 3.796 4.129 0.134 0.997 0.331 
2004 4.287 3.658 4.235 0.194 1.068 0.439 
2005 4.258 3.659 4.286 0.236 1.128 0.584 
2006 4.324 3.527 4.309 0.298 1.113 0.536 
2007 4.383 3.642 4.391 0.394 1.159 0.605 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 62.30 27.41 61.74 0.898 2.201 1.206 
2003 68.11 44.52 62.10 1.143 2.710 1.392 
2004 72.75 38.78 69.06 1.214 2.910 1.551 
2005 70.67 38.82 72.68 1.266 3.089 1.793 
2006 75.49 34.02 74.37 1.347 3.043 1.709 
2007 80.08 38.17 80.72 1.483 3.187 1.831 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 9.32% 62.42% 0.59% 27.38% 23.12% 15.49% 
2004 6.81% -12.89% 11.21% 6.18% 7.36% 11.40% 
2005 -2.86% 0.10% 5.23% 4.29% 6.18% 15.60% 
2006 6.82% -12.37% 2.33% 6.40% -1.49% -4.69% 
2007 6.08% 12.19% 8.55% 10.08% 4.71% 7.14% 
 
Economies of Scale 
Our estimation about economies of scale is still consistent with a reduced 
sample. Pure-SaaS firms have smaller economies of scale than non-SaaS 
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firms. Mixed-SaaS firms again demonstrate largest economies of scale 
among the three categories in balance sheet model. However, in the income 
statement model, mixed-SaaS firms demonstrate smaller economies of scale 
than non-SaaS firms. 
Then we do a cross-sample comparison between Table 8 and Table 13. Note 
that in our new sample with averagely smaller firm size, the economies of 
scale in non- and mixed-SaaS groups also become smaller in balance sheet 
model, which means those large firms we dropped might have larger 
economies of scales in balance sheet model. However for income statement 
model, non-SaaS firms in the reduced sample have smaller economies of 
scale than those of full sample while mixed-SaaS firms’ economies of scale 
become larger.  
Productivity of Inputs 
In Table 14, we find that most of the coefficients of the base line case (non-
SaaS firms) are at the same significant level as full sample’s, except for the 
coefficient of cost of goods sold which is less significant and is at 10% level.  
Capital: In balance sheet model, both pure- and mixed-SaaS firms have 
larger coefficients than those of non-SaaS firms, and the coefficient 
difference for pure-SaaS firms is significant at 10% level. The numbers of 
this finding are also consistent with the coefficient of COGS in income 
statement model: pure- and mixed-SaaS firms have larger marginal product 
of COGS, but none of them is statistically significant.  
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Labor: Our results also suggest that the output elasticity for employees in 
pure-SaaS firms is lowest whereas the output elasticity for employees in 
mixed-SaaS firms is highest among the three types of firms. However none 
of these coefficients is significant.  
Intangible asset: Our results are completely the same with the full sample 
results: pure-SaaS group is the largest and mixed-SaaS group is the smallest 
in intangible asset marginal product, and still none of the coefficients is 
significant. 
Total Factor Productivity 
The data about TFP demonstrate exactly the same pattern with full sample’s 
results in income statement model: pure-SaaS firms have largest TFP, then 
come mixed-SaaS firms, then non-SaaS firms at last. For balance sheet 
model, the rank of mixed-SaaS group and non-SaaS group is different from 
full sample’s results: for most of time mixed-SaaS firms have smaller TFP 
than non-SaaS firms. Another difference from full sample’s result is that for 
most years in both models, the number value of TFP of reduced sample is 
smaller than that of full sample except for mixed-SaaS firms in income 
statement: reduced sample has larger TFP while full sample have smaller 
TFP. For TFP annual growth rate, most of the results in the reduced sample 
are also of smaller value than their counterparts in full sample. As mentioned 
previously, our results about TFP is not rigorous because of the sample size 
and time period. So we will not give a conclusion here as well.  
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5.4.2. Using Other Regression Methods 
We first perform fixed-effect and random-effect panel-data regression 
models for our sample. As the presence of the serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity of our sample, we could use Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) with within-panel corrections as robustness check model. 
FGLS has been widely used in studying production functions by researchers 
in the IS literature (e.g., Dewan and Kraemer 2000, Cheng and Nault 2007, 
Mittal and Nault 2009). However, researchers also point out that FGLS may 
underestimate standard errors for panel data with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 1995; Han 2006). So we just do this for 
robustness check but will still hold our previous research results from PCSE. 
Economies of Scale 
The results of economies of scale derived from FGLS, FE and RE are 
presented in Table 16 and 17. 
 
Table 16. Economies of Scale (FGLS, FE, and RE) of BS Model  
    Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
FGLS           
Non-SaaS Full Sample 0.945 0.016 0.913 0.977 
  Reduced Sample 0.820 0.020 0.781 0.859 
Pure-SaaS Full Sample 0.898 0.061 0.778 1.017 
  Reduced Sample 0.888 0.065 0.761 1.015 
Mixed-SaaS Full Sample 1.041 0.015 1.012 1.069 
Reduced Sample 0.871 0.024 0.823 0.918 
FE           
Non-SaaS Full Sample 0.634 0.061 0.514 0.754 
  Reduced Sample 0.635 0.078 0.482 0.789 
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Pure-SaaS Full Sample 0.438 0.201 0.044 0.832 
  Reduced Sample 0.426 0.216 0.002 0.849 
Mixed-SaaS Full Sample 0.745 0.072 0.604 0.885 
  Reduced Sample 0.716 0.079 0.561 0.871 
RE           
Non-SaaS Full Sample 0.855 0.026 0.805 0.906 
  Reduced Sample 0.815 0.032 0.752 0.878 
Pure-SaaS Full Sample 0.799 0.159 0.487 1.110 
  Reduced Sample 0.817 0.163 0.498 1.137 
Mixed-SaaS Full Sample 0.963 0.036 0.892 1.034 
  Reduced Sample 0.872 0.047 0.780 0.964 
 
 
Table 17. Economies of Scale (FGLS, FE, and RE) of IN Model 
    Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
FGLS           
Non-SaaS Full Sample 1.071 0.009 1.054 1.088 
  Reduced Sample 1.068 0.014 1.041 1.096 
Pure-SaaS Full Sample 0.954 0.014 0.926 0.982 
  Reduced Sample 0.958 0.015 0.930 0.987 
Mixed-SaaS Full Sample 1.109 0.008 1.094 1.124 
Reduced Sample 1.051 0.016 1.020 1.082 
FE           
Non-SaaS Full Sample 0.765 0.072 0.062 0.906 
  Reduced Sample 0.784 0.099 0.589 0.979 
Pure-SaaS Full Sample 0.849 0.180 0.496 1.202 
  Reduced Sample 0.902 0.181 0.547 1.257 
Mixed-SaaS Full Sample 0.987 0.069 0.851 1.123 
  Reduced Sample 1.059 0.071 0.920 1.198 
RE           
Non-SaaS Full Sample 1.022 0.025 0.973 1.072 
  Reduced Sample 1.030 0.037 0.958 1.102 
Pure-SaaS Full Sample 0.912 0.152 0.615 1.209 
  Reduced Sample 0.923 0.164 0.601 1.245 
Mixed-SaaS Full Sample 1.082 0.032 1.019 1.146 




Reviewing Table 16 and Table 17, we get that the economies of scale of the 
three categories are mostly the same with our baseline case (full sample 
under PCSE regression): mixed-SaaS firms have the largest economies of 
scale and pure-SaaS firms have the smallest economies of scale. Only one 
exception is that in FGLS regression of reduced sample under income 
statement model, non-SaaS firms have slightly bigger economies of scale 
than mixed-SaaS. Also, in balance sheet model in Table 16, reduced sample 
has smaller coefficients in almost every regression model and every firm 
category. This comparison between full sample and reduced sample is just in 
the opposite direction for most cases in income statement model although it 
is not that obvious as balances sheet model.  
Productivity of Inputs 
We present the results of marginal product in Table 18 and 19. Based on the 
explanatory power of regression methods and to make the paper to be 
concise, we will only give short description on FGLS results. 
 
Table 18. FGLS, FE, and RE estimation of BS Model  
Coefficient 
Est. 













K 0.130*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.122** 0.144*** 0.138*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
p*K 0.095*** 0.123*** -0.109 -0.135 0.027 0.050 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.220) (0.170) (0.807) (0.671) 
m*K 0.070*** 0.107*** 0.079 0.086 0.032 0.0385 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.156) (0.187) (0.436) (0.416) 
L 0.808*** 0.704*** 0.508*** 0.485*** 0.700*** 0.658*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p*L -0.134** -0.042 -0.126 -0.115 -0.115 -0.078 
70 
 
 (0.026) (0.532) (0.475) (0.557) (0.560) (0.708) 
m*L 0.044 -0.045 0.043 -0.007 0.081 0.008 
 (0.250) (0.330) (0.713) (0.959) (0.235) (0.918) 
I 0.007* 0.011*** 0.022** 0.028** 0.012 0.019* 
 (0.075) (0.002) (0.043) (0.022) (0.212) (0.068) 
p*I -0.008 -0.012 0.038 0.041 0.032 0.031 
 (0.541) (0.416) (0.154) (0.189) (0.519) (0.552) 
m*I -0.018** -0.012 -0.011 0.002 -0.004 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.262) (0.393) (0.928) (0.775) (0.611) 
N 770 634 803 664 803 664 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 19. FGLS, FE, and RE estimation of IN Model  
Coefficient 
Est. 













C 0.096*** 0.046*** 0.007 0.001 0.088*** 0.059** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.897) (0.987) (0.000) (0.033) 
p*C 0.100** 0.090 -0.224** -0.295*** 0.106 0.100 
 (0.044) (0.117) (0.024) (0.005) (0.655) (0.701) 
m*C -0.018 -0.018 0.038 0.013 -0.022 -0.006 
 (0.301) (0.420) (0.570) (0.876) (0.627) (0.913) 
R 0.145*** 0.224*** 0.086 0.145 0.098** 0.158*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.366) (0.227) (0.015) (0.004) 
p*R -0.078* -0.132** 0.186 0.153 -0.042 -0.083 
 (0.097) (0.011) (0.210) (0.350) (0.832) (0.705) 
m*R -0.022 -0.122*** 0.018 -0.027 0.008 -0.052 
 (0.465) (0.000) (0.878) (0.846) (0.900) (0.520) 
S 0.829*** 0.799*** 0.673*** 0.637*** 0.836*** 0.813*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p*S -0.139*** -0.068 0.121 0.259 -0.174 -0.124 
 (0.001) (0.164) (0.668) (0.399) (0.469) (0.638) 
m*S 0.078** 0.124*** 0.166 0.290 0.074 0.099 
 (0.028) (0.004) (0.294) (0.137) (0.381) (0.354) 
N 770 634 803 664 803 664 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Under FGLS regression, more coefficients of become significant than PCSE 
referring to Table 9 and 10. Comparing the coefficients which are significant, 
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FGLS gives same direction of changes in both full and reduced sample. That 
is: 
Capital: In balance sheet model, pure- and mixed-SaaS firms both have 
larger marginal product of Capital. In income statement model, the 
productivity of COGS is better than non-SaaS firms for pure-SaaS firms. 
Labor: In balance sheet model, pure-SaaS firms have smaller productivity 
of Labor than non-SaaS firms. In income statement model, the productivity 
of R&D staff and SG&A staff in pure-SaaS firms are both worse than non-
SaaS firms. Mixed-SaaS firms also have lower productivity of R&D staff. 
However, SG&A productivity of mixed-SaaS firms are better than non-SaaS 
firms. 
Intangible Asset: Only one coefficient is significant under FGLS and it 
shows that mixed-SaaS firms in the full sample have significantly (5% level) 
lower productivity in intangible asset. 
Total Factor Productivity 
Our results about total factor productivity are illustrated in Table 20 to Table 
25. To keep the brevity of the paper, we will not express our results one by 
one. Due to the limitation of our sample size and time period, we still fail to 
get a consistent growth pattern of SaaS business. And we hope future 




 Table 20. Total Factor Productivity (Full Sample, FGLS) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.347 3.790 4.263 0.179  0.660 0.113 
2003 4.445 4.250 4.308 0.403 0.865 0.248 
2004 4.546 4.082 4.427 0.515 0.960 0.362 
2005 4.615 4.124 4.503 0.621 1.070 0.502 
2006 4.661 4.145 4.563 0.697 1.079 0.508 
2007 4.723 4.269 4.638 0.774 1.186 0.574 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 77.25 44.26 71.02 1.196 1.935 1.120 
2003 85.16 70.08 74.32 1.496 2.375 1.281 
2004 94.26 59.26 83.66 1.674 2.612 1.436 
2005 101.0 61.81 90.29 1.861 2.915 1.652 
2006 105.7 63.12 95.87 2.008 2.942 1.662 
2007 112.5 71.47 103.3 2.168 3.274 1.775 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 10.24% 58.36% 4.66% 25.11% 22.75% 14.41% 
2004 10.68% -15.44% 12.57% 11.85% 9.970% 12.09% 
2005 7.14% 4.29% 7.920% 11.18% 11.63% 15.03% 
2006 4.71% 2.120% 6.18% 7.90% 0.90% 0.60% 
2007 6.400% 13.24% 7.790% 8.0% 11.29% 6.820% 
 
Table 21. Total Factor Productivity (Reduced Sample, FGLS) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.318 3.769 3.985 0.190  0.611 0.286 
2003 4.380 4.207 4.002 0.382 0.803 0.401 
2004 4.461 4.026 4.088 0.488 0.889 0.502 
2005 4.498 4.042 4.151 0.562 0.982 0.611 
2006 4.540 4.046 4.199 0.603 0.973 0.596 
2007 4.578 4.167 4.274 0.663 1.071 0.658 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 75.04 43.34 53.79 1.209 1.842 1.331 
2003 79.81 67.16 54.71 1.465 2.232 1.493 
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2004 86.57 56.04 59.62 1.629 2.433 1.652 
2005 89.84 56.94 63.50 1.754 2.670 1.842 
2006 93.69 57.17 66.62 1.828 2.646 1.815 
2007 97.32 64.52 71.79 1.941 2.918 1.931 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 6.35% 54.96% 1.71% 21.17% 21.17% 12.15% 
2004 8.48% -16.56% 8.98% 11.18% 8.98% 10.63% 
2005 3.77% 1.61% 6.50% 7.68% 9.75% 11.52% 
2006 4.29% 0.40% 4.92% 4.19% -0.90% -1.49% 
2007 3.87% 12.86% 7.77% 6.18% 10.30% 6.40% 
 
 
Table 22. Total Factor Productivity (Full Sample, FE) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.224 3.838 3.785 1.142  0.283 1.191 
2003 4.333 4.224 3.837 1.339 1.166 1.247 
2004 4.420 4.311 3.954 1.442 1.091 1.369 
2005 4.494 4.498 4.065 1.545 1.115 1.452 
2006 4.564 4.607 4.138 1.614 1.081 1.504 
2007 4.687 4.847 4.224 1.739 1.221 1.569 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 68.31 46.43 44.04 3.133 1.327 3.292 
2003 76.17 68.31 46.39 3.815 3.209 3.480 
2004 83.10 74.55 52.14 4.229 2.976 3.931 
2005 89.48 89.84 58.27 4.688 3.050 4.272 
2006 95.97 100.2 62.70 5.023 2.947 4.500 
2007 108.5 127.4 68.31 5.692 3.390 4.802 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 11.52% 47.11% 5.34% 21.77% 141.8% 5.72% 
2004 9.09% 9.13% 12.41% 10.85% -7.27% 12.98% 
2005 7.68% 20.51% 11.74% 10.85% 2.49% 8.65% 
2006 7.25% 11.52% 7.61% 7.14% -3.37% 5.34% 




 Table 23. Total Factor Productivity (Reduced Sample, FE) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.032 3.113 3.726 0.937  0.190 0.518 
2003 4.099 3.478 3.741 1.105 0.504 0.680 
2004 4.173 3.550 3.824 1.191 0.682 0.748 
2005 4.199 3.724 3.902 1.263 0.814 0.898 
2006 4.267 3.802 3.937 1.316 0.843 0.848 
2007 4.355 4.032 4.032 1.431 0.937 0.937 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 56.37 22.49 41.51 2.552 1.209 1.679 
2003 60.27 32.40 42.14 3.019 1.655 1.974 
2004 64.91 34.81 45.79 3.290 1.978 2.113 
2005 66.62 41.43 49.50 3.536 2.257 2.454 
2006 71.31 44.79 51.29 3.728 2.324 2.336 
2007 77.87 56.37 56.37 4.183 2.552 2.552 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 6.92% 44.05% 1.51% 18.29% 36.89% 17.59% 
2004 7.69% 7.47% 8.65% 8.98% 19.48% 7.04% 
2005 2.63% 19.01% 8.11% 7.47% 14.11% 16.14% 
2006 7.04% 8.11% 3.60% 5.44% 2.98% -4.81% 
2007 9.20% 25.86% 9.92% 12.19% 9.81% 9.28% 
 
 
Table 24. Total Factor Productivity (Full Sample, RE) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.124 3.686 4.173 0.222  0.634 0.138 
2003 4.264 4.148 4.229 0.471 0.875 0.310 
2004 4.348 4.073 4.351 0.560 1.008 0.426 
2005 4.403 4.097 4.434 0.650 1.117 0.594 
2006 4.464 4.063 4.486 0.713 1.153 0.581 
2007 4.567 4.203 4.551 0.815 1.234 0.660 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 61.81 39.89 64.94 1.249 1.885 1.148 
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2003 71.09 63.31 68.65 1.602 2.399 1.363 
2004 77.32 58.70 77.56 1.751 2.740 1.531 
2005 81.70 60.17 84.27 1.916 3.056 1.811 
2006 86.83 58.14 88.77 2.040 3.168 1.788 
2007 96.26 66.87 94.73 2.259 3.435 1.935 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 15.03% 58.72% 5.72% 28.27% 27.25% 18.82% 
2004 8.76% -7.27% 12.98% 9.31% 14.22% 12.30% 
2005 5.65% 2.49% 8.65% 9.42% 11.52% 18.29% 
2006 6.29% -3.37% 5.34% 6.50% 3.67% -1.29% 
2007 10.85% 15.03% 6.72% 10.74% 8.44% 8.22% 
 
 
Table 25. Total Factor Productivity (Reduced Sample, RE) 
Original Intercept Coefficients 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 4.095 3.656 3.979 0.193  0.592 0.151 
2003 4.181 4.108 3.988 0.412 0.818 0.304 
2004 4.252 3.998 4.072 0.489 0.933 0.381 
2005 4.249 3.994 4.128 0.546 1.025 0.526 
2006 4.312 3.914 4.150 0.592 1.035 0.471 
2007 4.386 4.035 4.232 0.688 1.097 0.560 
Total Factor Productivity 
  BS Model  IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2002 60.04 38.71 53.46 1.213 1.808 1.162 
2003 65.43 60.85 53.95 1.510 2.266 1.355 
2004 70.25 54.49 58.66 1.631 2.542 1.464 
2005 70.04 54.27 62.05 1.726 2.787 1.692 
2006 74.59 50.10 63.46 1.808 2.815 1.602 
2007 80.32 56.53 68.86 1.990 2.995 1.751 
Growth Rate of TFP 
  BS Model IN Model  
  Non PS MS Non PS MS 
2003 8.97% 57.21% 0.90% 24.48% 25.36% 16.59% 
2004 7.37% -10.45% 8.73% 8.00% 12.19% 8.00% 
2005 -0.30% -0.40% 5.78% 5.87% 9.64% 15.60% 
2006 6.50% -7.69% 2.28% 4.71% 1.01% -5.35% 





In this paper, we first evaluate how SaaS model influences the financial performance 
of the firm. We adopt four commonly used financial ratios to measure firm 
performance: price to book ratio, return on asset, return on equity, and debt ratio. Price 
to book ratio reflects the market’s expectation on the firm’s stock and the rest three are 
signals of the firm’s real business performance. Our result reveals that pure-SaaS firms 
have significantly better performance in all the four ratios than non-SaaS firms. 
Mixed-SaaS firms also win non-SaaS slightly in the four ratios but the results are not 
that significant as pure-SaaS firms. The advantage of pure-SaaS firms in price to book 
ratio is extraordinarily outstanding. It is almost 3 times larger than the same ratio of 
mixed- and non-SaaS firms as well as the industry average. Practically, the excellent 
performance of pure-SaaS firms proves that the SaaS model is indeed an outstanding 
technology innovation as well as business innovation. Investors and entrepreneurs may 
get some inspirations and software providers may consider join this trend.  
We explore the relationship between the SaaS model and the productivity of software 
vendors using a Cobb-Douglas production function approach. Our results indicate the 
presence of significant scale economies in mixed-SaaS firms and significant 
diseconomies of scale in pure-SaaS software companies. This result is an overthrow to 
prior studies. Conventional software application is well-accepted as they enjoy both 
supply- and demand-side economies of scale. However, pure-SaaS vendors actually 
sell “two products”: a software application and the IT management service of that 
application, while the IT management service does not have zero variable cost, which 
reduces supply-side economies of scale. Also, the server farms at SaaS vendors are 
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subject to high congestion costs, a classical example of demand-side diseconomies of 
scale. As a result, the production function of SaaS firms has much lower economies of 
scale. In the reality, most pure-SaaS firms are still in their rising stage during our 
sampling period. Gradually they will get more experience and enlarge customer base 
and might be of more economies of scale in the future. For mixed-SaaS firms, they 
have been long existing veteran non-SaaS players before they start their SaaS business 
segment. Their well-run packaged software business, established customer word-of-
mouth, and economies of scope from dual-model may offset the shortage of SaaS 
business. The implication of this finding is that it is more difficult for pure-SaaS firms 
to compete with larger established software companies when they start to offer 
competing SaaS applications. 
Our productivity analysis suggests that the capital of pure-SaaS firms contributes more 
to firm output compared to non-SaaS firms. At the same time, labor contributes 
significantly less to the output of pure-SaaS firms compared to non-SaaS firms. The 
low labor productivity results from both R&D and marketing categories. In contrast, 
our analysis also shows that employees of mixed-SaaS firms contribute much more to 
output, with efficient labor productivity in both R&D and marketing and sales 
activities. These differences are partially due to the different stage of development as 
well as experience accumulation of pure- and mixed-SaaS firms. Overall, our analysis 
seems to imply that mixed-SaaS firms are more efficient than pure-SaaS firms in 
several aspects. In other words, a "hybrid" model combining traditional software with 
SaaS could be the most efficient organizational form of software companies in the 
future. Even if the traditional software delivery model’s eclipse by SaaS seems to be 
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inevitable, it is too soon to write the obituary for traditional software companies as 
Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP, which are all belatedly moving into SaaS. For pure-SaaS 
players, our results imply that they would better to improve their labor efficiency 
especially in R&D and marketing functions. 
For our performance analysis, there remain a lot of spaces to improve. Firstly, we have 
a limited sample of pure-SaaS firms. And the number of firms is even restricted by our 
sampling method as we mentioned in section 3. As currently the SaaS market is still in 
its early phase, when the market becomes more mature, researcher could get more 
samples and the findings will be more stable and reliable. Future researchers could 
collect more data with the development of this market to fertilize the sample. Also, 
with the limitation of information provided in the annual report, we cannot tell the 
specific time when the mixed-SaaS firms start to run another business model. 
Comparison of effects of different models on the same company may bring about 
extremely meaningful findings. Researchers may try some direct methods like survey 
to collect more detailed information. Lastly, our hypothesis could also be tested using 
more advanced financial ratios such as Tobin’s q if necessary data could be obtained. 
There are several possible extensions to the productivity analysis as well. First, one 
major limitation is that we only have publicly available data from Compustat, so we do 
not have detailed contract-level revenue stream to calculate the exact output of SaaS 
firms in each year. Also, we cannot assess the proportion of revenue generated from 
SaaS in mixed-SaaS firms. With those proprietary data, researchers could shed more 
light on the differences between SaaS and non-SaaS production functions. Another 
possibility for further research is examining the overall business risk of pure-SaaS 
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firms. From the perspective of licensing, the subscription-based pricing provides a 
smoother revenue spread over multiple years, on the one hand. On the other hand, it 
reduces the switching cost of buyers and may increase the variability of the number of 
customers. It is not obvious whether the variability/volatility of revenue from 
subscription-based pricing is smaller or larger than that from perpetual licensing plans. 
At the same time, since SaaS firms centralize the IT infrastructure and related IT 
management, the operation risks also become “centralized”. For example, 
Salesforce.com has had several outage events in the past, leaving thousands of 
businesses without access to their applications at the same time. The impact of the 
centralized risk on the valuation of SaaS firms or their products pricing is another 
important issue. Competition and product differentiation are clearly important traits of 
the software industry. Modeling the impacts of competition on the performance of 
SaaS firms could be another fruitful research direction. Furthermore, since most 
mixed-SaaS firms transit from non-SaaS firms, it will be of value to investigate how 
their performance and productivity will change after their SaaS launch. Will more and 
more non-SaaS firms become mixed-SaaS firms? What is the difference in the firm’s 
productivity before and after its SaaS initiative? Will pure-SaaS firms also start non-
SaaS business and become mixed-SaaS from another direction? And if so, what will 
happen to their productivity? So researchers may keep watching whether pure-SaaS 
firms would transit to mixed-SaaS firms by starting conventional packaged software 
business as well. Last but not least, future research could seek for more detailed 
financial data to spilt the currently used input factors to the production, which will 
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Pure SaaS (11) Mix SaaS (57) Non SaaS (144) 
CONCUR 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC 724 SOLUTIONS INC 
DEALERTRACK 
HOLDINGS INC 




DEMANDTEC INC ARIBA INC ACTIVISION INC 
KENEXA CORP ART TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP INC 
ACTUATE CORP 
LIVEPERSON INC AUTODESK INC AGILE SOFTWARE CORP 
OMNITURE INC BLACKBAUD INC ALTIRIS INC 
RIGHTNOW 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
BLACKBOARD INC APROPOS TECHNOLOGY 
INC 
SALESFORCE.COM INC BOTTOMLINE 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
ARTEMIS INTL SOLUTIONS 
CORP 
SUCCESSFACTORS INC CADENCE DESIGN 
SYSTEMS INC 
ARTISTDIRECT INC 




VOCUS INC CARESCIENCE INC ASIAINFO HOLDINGS INC 
 CENTRA SOFTWARE INC BACKWEB TECHNOLOGIES 
LTD 
 CITRIX SYSTEMS INC BAM ENTERTAINMENT INC 
 CLICK COMMERCE INC BINDVIEW DEVELOPMENT 
CORP 
 COGNOS INC BLADELOGIC INC 




BMC SOFTWARE INC 
 DOUBLECLICK INC BORLAND SOFTWARE CORP 
 EBIX INC BRIO SOFTWARE INC 




 GOLDLEAF FINANCIAL 
SOLUTIONS 
CAMINUS CORP 
 I2 TECHNOLOGIES INC CARREKER CORP 
 I-MANY INC CHORDIANT SOFTWARE INC




 INDUS INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
COMMERCE ONE INC 
 INFORMATICA CORP COMMVAULT SYSTEMS INC 
 INKTOMI CORP COMSHARE INC 
 INTERWOVEN INC CONCERTO SOFTWARE INC 
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 SUMTOTAL SYSTEMS INC HPL TECHNOLOGIES INC 
 UNICA CORP IMANAGE INC 
 VISUAL SCIENCES INC/DE INET TECHNOLOGIES INC 
 WEBSENSE INC INTERACTIVE 
INTELLIGENCE INC 
 WORKSTREAM INC INTERGRAPH CORP 
  INTERNET SECURITY 
SYSTEMS 
  INTERPLAY 
ENTERTAINMENT CORP 
  INTERVIDEO INC 
  KANA SOFTWARE INC 
  KNOVA SOFTWARE INC 
  LIBERATE TECHNOLOGIES 
  LIGHTSPAN INC 
  LYRIS INC 
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  MAGMA DESIGN 
AUTOMATION INC 
  MAJESCO ENTERTAINMENT 
CO 
  MARIMBA INC 
  MATRIXONE INC 
  METASOLV INC 
  MICROMUSE INC 
  MICROSTRATEGY INC 
  MOBIUS MGMT SYSTEMS 
INC 
  MSC SOFTWARE CORP 
  NASSDA CORP 
  NEON SYSTEMS INC 
  NETEGRITY INC 
  NETIQ CORP 
  NEXPRISE INC 
  NEXTWAVE WIRELESS INC 
  NIKU CORP 
  NUANCE 
COMMUNICATIONS-OLD 
  OASYS MOBILE INC 
  ON2 TECHNOLOGIES INC 
  OPEN SOLUTIONS INC 
  OPEN TV CORP 
  OPENWAVE SYSTEMS INC 
  OPNET TECHNOLOGIES INC 
  OPSWARE INC 
  OPTIO SOFTWARE INC 
  PALMSOURCE INC 
  PERSISTENCE SOFTWARE 
INC 
  PHARSIGHT CORP 
  PHASE FORWARD INC 
  PHOENIX TECHNOLOGIES 
LTD 
  PIVOTAL CORP 
  PLUMTREE SOFTWARE INC 
  PORTAL SOFTWARE INC 
  PRECISE SOFTWARE 
SOLUTIONS 
  PRIMUS KNOWLEDGE 
SOLUTIONS 
  PRINTCAFE SOFTWARE INC 
  QUEST SOFTWARE INC 
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  RADVISION LTD 
  REALNETWORKS INC 
  RED HAT INC 
  RETEK INC 
  SAGENT TECHNOLOGY INC 
  SCIENTIFIC LEARNING 
CORP 
  SCO GROUP INC 
  SEEBEYOND TECHNOLOGY 
CORP 
  SERENA SOFTWARE INC 
  SIBONEY CORP 
  SOFTBRANDS INC 
  SOFTECH INC 
  SSA GLOBAL 
TECHNOLOGIES 
  SUNGARD DATA SYSTEMS 
INC 
  SUPPORTSOFT INC 
  SYMANTEC CORP 
  SYNPLICITY INC 
  SYSTEMS & COMPUTER 
TECH CORP 
  T/R SYSTEMS INC 
  TANGRAM ENTP 
SOLUTIONS 
  TELECOMMUNICATION SYS 
INC 
  TENFOLD CORP 
  TENGTU INTL CORP 
  TIBCO SOFTWARE INC 
  TIMBERLINE SOFTWARE 
CORP 
  TRIZETTO GROUP INC 
  TUMBLEWEED 
COMMUNICATIONS CO 
  ULTICOM INC 
  ULTIMATE SOFTWARE 
GROUP INC 
  VANTAGEMED CORP 
  VASTERA INC 
  VERISIGN INC 
  VERISITY LTD 
  VERSATA INC 
  VERTICALNET INC 





  VIGNETTE CORP 
  VIRAGE INC 
  VITRIA TECHNOLOGY INC 
  WATCHGUARD 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
  WEBMETHODS INC 
  WITNESS SYSTEMS INC 
 
Appendix 2 
Pure SaaS firms: 







1993 1999 Accounting & Finance 
DEALERTRACK HOLDINGS 
INC 
2001 2005 Sales and finance software for 
automotive retail industry 
DEMANDTEC INC 1999 2007 SCM 
KENEXA CORP 1987 2005 Workforce management 
LIVEPERSON INC 1995 2000 CRM 
OMNITURE INC 1996 2006 Web analytics 
RIGHTNOW 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
1997 2004 CRM 
SALESFORCE.COM INC 1999 2004 CRM 
SUCCESSFACTORS INC 2001 2007 Workforce management 
TALEO CORP 1996 2005 Workforce management 
VOCUS INC 1992 2005 CRM 
*From Software Industry Equity Report 2007 by SoftwareEquity Group L.L.C.  
 
